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ABSTRACT 
Our electoral system is vulnerable to terrorist attacks, natural disasters, 
and other calamities that can render polling places inaccessible, trigger mass 
evacuations, or disrupt governmental operations to the point that conducting 
an election becomes impracticable. Many states lack “election emergency” 
laws that empower officials to adequately respond to these crises. As a result, 
courts are frequently called upon to adjudicate the consequences of election 
emergencies as a matter of constitutional law, often applying vague, 
subjective, ad hoc standards in rushed, politically charged proceedings. This 
Article examines the legal steps various government actors took in response to 
terrorist attacks and natural disasters that disrupted impending or ongoing 
elections throughout the early twenty-first century, including the September 11 
attacks on New York City, Hurricane Katrina’s destruction of New Orleans, 
Hurricane Sandy’s devastation of New Jersey and New York, and Hurricane 
Matthew’s impact along the southeastern United States. It then analyzes the 
constitutional issues that such election emergencies raise. 
Courts may prevent or remedy constitutional violations triggered by 
election emergencies by postponing elections or modifying the rules governing 
them, but the Constitution virtually never requires courts to extend deadlines 
for activities people have a substantial period of time to perform, including 
registering to vote or participating in early voting. Under the laws of most 
states, courts also should generally decline to hold open individual polling 
places past their statutorily designated closing time on Election Day based on 
ordinary, run-of-the-mill problems that temporarily interfere with their 
operations. States can and should alleviate the need for such constitutional 
litigation by enacting laws that specifically empower election officials to 
respond appropriately to election emergencies. This Article provides principles 
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to guide the development of election emergency statutes, which should 
distinguish among election modifications, postponements, and cancellations. 
These laws should provide objective, specific criteria to guide and limit 
election officials’ discretion, and balance preserving the right to vote against 
protecting the integrity of the electoral process. To the greatest extent possible, 
election officials should be required to delay, reschedule, or extend voting 
periods ahead of time, before votes are cast, rather than after voter turnout or 
preliminary election results are known. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,1 which destroyed the Twin 
Towers in New York City and killed thousands of innocent people, occurred 
the same day as the New York Democratic and Republican primary elections.2 
In the years since, natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, 
Hurricane Sandy in New Jersey and New York, and Hurricane Matthew in the 
southeastern United States have occurred shortly before or during elections, in 
some cases severely disrupting them.3  
Most state election codes do not contain provisions that specifically 
attempt to mitigate the impact of public health crises, extreme weather events, 
natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and other calamities (collectively, 
“emergencies”) on the electoral process.4 State laws dealing with such 
emergencies typically focus on protecting human life and limiting the extent of 
collateral damage without addressing impending or ongoing elections.5 As a 
result, state officials attempting to manage emergencies that affect pending 
elections face unnecessary uncertainty concerning the scope of their powers 
that complicates their decision-making processes. Without a clear-cut 
statutorily authorized or required response, their actions may be attacked as 
ultra vires, politically motivated, or unnecessarily narrow or overbroad.6 In 
some cases, state law’s failure to authorize executive officials to adequately 
ameliorate a disaster’s effects on impending elections has led to constitutional 
challenges, causing federal courts to determine the proper response in the 
midst of the emergency itself, ostensibly as a matter of constitutional 
interpretation.7  
Very few academic or other professional works have examined election 
emergencies in any depth.8 A few articles and reports assess the potential 
 
 1 September 11, 2001 has properly been recognized as “a day of immeasurable tragedy.” Bourgeois v. 
Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1312 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 2 See infra Section I.A.  
 3 See generally infra Part I (examining recent election emergencies).  
 4 See NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC’YS OF STATE TASK FORCE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FOR ELECTIONS, 
STATE LAWS AND PRACTICES FOR THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OF ELECTIONS 4, 6, 8 (2014) (examining the 
few state laws addressing emergencies during elections). 
 5 See infra notes 423–24 and accompanying text.  
 6 See, e.g., infra notes 122–80 and accompanying text; see also infra note 420.  
 7 See, e.g., Fla. Democratic Party v. Scott (Scott I), 215 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1259 (N.D. Fla. 2016); infra 
notes 334–42, 414 and accompanying text; see also Amended and Restated Petition, Wallace v. Chertoff, No. 
05-5519 (E.D. La. Dec. 14, 2005), Doc. No. 9 [hereinafter Wallace Petition]. 
 8 See, e.g., DAVID HUCKABEE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32660, DECIDING TO POSTPONE 
ELECTIONS: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES (2004) (discussing election delays caused by 
hurricanes); LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, EXPECTING THE UNEXPECTED: ELECTION 
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impact of terrorist attacks on elections, particularly at the federal level.9 
Several discuss the unique issues that arise in holding elections when disasters 
have displaced large numbers of voters from their homes,10 with a particular 
focus on Hurricane Katrina in 200611 and various international elections;12 a 
 
PLANNING FOR EMERGENCIES (2013), https://lawyerscommittee.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Emergency-
Planning-Report-10-29-13.pdf.  
Some pieces briefly mention election-related disasters while focusing primarily on other issues. See 
Anthony J. Gaughan, Ramshackle Federalism: America’s Archaic and Dysfunctional Presidential Election 
System, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1021, 1034–35, 1042–43 (2016) (discussing Professor Jerry Goldfeder’s work 
and advocating for the creation of a federal task force to engage in contingency planning and help state 
authorities conduct elections following disasters); Steven F. Huefner, Remedying Election Wrongs, 44 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 265, 276–77 (2007) (explaining how natural disasters can “require an adjustment of when and 
how . . . elections would occur”); Steven J. Mulroy, Right Without a Remedy? The “Butterfly Ballot” Case and 
Court-Ordered Federal Election “Revotes,” 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 215, 235–36, 245 (2001) (arguing that 
states have power to reschedule elections due to terrorist attacks or natural disasters); Jim Rossi, State 
Executive Lawmaking in Crisis, 56 DUKE L.J. 237, 271 (2006) (briefly mentioning postponements of elections 
due to disasters); see also Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election 
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 992 (2005) (discussing various 
circumstances under which a court may order a re-vote).  
The Federal Judicial Center has compiled a comprehensive list of federal election cases, including 
those stemming from natural disasters. Election Litigation: Studies in Emergency Election Litigation, FED. 
JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/content/case-studies (last visited Dec. 31, 2017) (containing brief summaries of 
election-related rulings). 
 9 ERIC A. FISCHER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32654, SAFEGUARDING FEDERAL ELECTIONS 
FROM POSSIBLE TERRORIST ATTACK: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS (2004) (discussing state and federal 
power to delay elections due to terrorist attacks); John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, If Terrorists Attacked 
Our Presidential Election, 3 ELECTION L.J. 597 (2004) (identifying each point in the electoral process that 
might be disrupted by terrorist attacks); Jerry H. Goldfeder, Could Terrorists Derail a Presidential Election?, 
32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523 (2005) (discussing elections disrupted by the September 11 attacks); James 
Neiland, Note, Executive Suspension of National Elections: Sacrificing the American Dream to Avoid a 
Spanish Nightmare?, 15 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 389, 396–97 (2005) (discussing terrorist attacks 
that occurred days before elections in Spain and lessons for the United States); Steven H. Huefner, 
Withstanding Election Day Terrorism, ELECTION L. @ MORITZ: E-BOOK ON ELECTION L. (July 19, 2004), 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/part7/elections_pres02.html (arguing that if terrorist attacks disrupt 
a presidential election, federal law would likely allow the affected states to delay their elections, any delayed 
elections should be completed before the Electoral College meets at the statutorily designated time, and a state-
level response would be preferable to delaying the entire election nationwide); see also Huefner, supra note 8, 
at 276–77 (mentioning terror attacks as a possible cause of electoral problems). 
 10 The seminal piece on this topic is Developments in the Law: Voting and Democracy, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 1127, 1183–86 (2006) [hereinafter Voting and Democracy].  
 11 Kristen Clarke & Damon T. Hewitt, Protecting Voting Rights in the Context of Mass Displacement, 
51 HOW. L.J. 511 (2008) (identifying potential solutions to the problems Hurricane Katrina posed for voter 
participation); Maya Roy, Note, The State of Democracy After Disaster: How to Maintain the Right to Vote for 
Displaced Citizens, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 203, 206–11, 226–30 (2007) (analyzing litigation over elections 
in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina and suggesting electoral reforms); Michelle Rupp, Note, 
Internally Displaced Persons and Electoral Participation: A Call for Best Practices, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
681, 694–97 (2011) (discussing voting disruptions caused by Hurricane Katrina in the course of examining 
displaced persons’ voting rights under international law). 
 12 HUCKABEE, supra note 8, at 9–11 (discussing foreign elections held under threats of violence or in 
the midst of ongoing violence); Voting and Democracy, supra note 10, at 1183–86 (discussing elections in 
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few pieces analyze elections held in the wake of Hurricane Sandy in 2012.13 
Several researchers have compiled laws governing election emergencies,14 
while others have discussed the power of the federal government and states to 
delay elections due to such exigent circumstances.15 Despite the gradually 
increasing attention being paid to election emergencies, several critical aspects 
of the issue remain unaddressed in this burgeoning literature. This Article 
seeks to begin filling these gaps, offering several main contributions.  
Most basically, this Article suggests that three paradigms exist to deal with 
disrupted elections: modifications, postponements, and cancellations. An 
“election modification” accepts as valid everything that transpired before an 
election emergency arose and simply authorizes additional methods of, or time 
for, voting. The most common type of election modification is a court order 
holding particular polling places open for a few extra hours at the behest of a 
candidate.16 New Jersey’s response to Hurricane Sandy is a prominent and 
controversial example of an election modification following a natural 
disaster.17  
With an “election postponement,” an election scheduled for a particular 
date is held on a different day while holding constant as much as possible, 
including the identities of the candidates running, the people entitled to vote, 
and potentially even the candidates’ spending. An election postponement is a 
“static” approach to addressing election emergencies: the rescheduled election 
 
Bosnia); Roy, supra note 11, at 211–19 (discussing elections in South Africa, Iraq, and Mexico); Rupp, supra 
note 11, at 692–94 (discussing elections in Bosnia and Sri Lanka).  
 13 ERIC FISCHER & KEVIN COLEMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42808, HURRICANE SANDY AND THE 
2012 ELECTION: FACT SHEET 2–4 (2012) (detailing measures various states implemented to conduct elections 
despite Hurricane Sandy); Robert M. Stein, Election Administration During Natural Disasters and 
Emergencies: Hurricane Sandy and the 2012 Election, 14 ELECTION L.J. 66 (2015) (conducting an empirical 
analysis of elections held in the wake of Hurricane Sandy). 
 14 L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21942, STATE ELECTION LAWS: OVERVIEW OF 
STATUTES REGARDING EMERGENCY ELECTION POSTPONEMENT WITHIN THE STATE (2004); FISCHER ET AL., 
supra note 9, at 5–7; Edward B. Foley, Election Emergency Statutes for 25 Critical States in the November 
Election, ELECTION L. @ MORITZ: E-BOOK ON ELECTION L., http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/part7/ 
elections_pres06.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2018); see also NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC’YS OF STATE, supra note 4, at 
4–5. 
 15 JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32613, POSTPONEMENT AND RESCHEDULING OF 
ELECTIONS TO FEDERAL OFFICE (2014); FISCHER ET AL., supra note 9, at 2–5; KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL32471, EXECUTIVE BRANCH POWER TO POSTPONE ELECTIONS (2004); Huefner, supra 
note 9; Nieland, supra note 9, at 414–17. 
 16 See, e.g., infra note 414. 
 17 See infra Section I.C. An election modification also occurred in Washington County, Pennsylvania, 
in 1985 when flooding caused an election judge to suspend voting in eleven precincts and reschedule it for two 
weeks later, allowing results from other precincts to remain undisturbed. In re General Election—1985, 531 
A.2d 836, 838 (Pa. 1987) (cited in Goldfeder, supra note 9, at 532–34).  
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seeks to approximate, as closely as possible, what the results of the originally 
scheduled election would have been. In contrast to an election modification, 
any votes cast on the originally scheduled election day are ignored; the election 
is treated as if it occurred entirely on the rescheduled day. New York’s 
approach to the 2001 primary elections is perhaps the most prominent example 
of an election postponement.18  
An “election cancellation” entirely nullifies the originally scheduled 
election with the expectation that a new election will be held at some point in 
the future. The future election is treated as a discrete, independent event. The 
candidates who will appear on the ballot, the voters who are permitted to cast 
ballots, and other critical components of the election are determined entirely 
anew rather than attempting to hold them constant from the originally 
scheduled election. Unlike an election postponement, an election cancellation 
is a dynamic approach that largely ignores anything that had occurred in 
connection with the previously scheduled election. The rescheduled election is 
therefore able to reflect changes in circumstances to a much greater extent. 
New Orleans engaged in a well-known election cancellation following 
Hurricane Katrina.19 
A state’s approach to an election emergency—whether it engages in an 
election modification, postponement, or cancellation—is determined in part by 
the powers its election-specific emergency laws, or more general emergency 
statutes, grant to the governor or election officials. When state laws are 
inadequate or no applicable laws exist, courts are often asked to step in on a 
largely ad hoc basis as a constitutional matter and craft remedies out of whole 
cloth.   
This Article’s second main contribution is to explore the constitutional 
issues that arise when states lack laws empowering election officials to 
adequately respond to election emergencies. It analyzes the circumstances 
under which the Constitution entitles voters to modifications of election 
procedures or deadlines due to either widespread disasters or smaller-scale 
disruptions to particular polling places. It contends that neither the Due Process 
Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause empowers courts to extend deadlines 
 
 18 See infra Section I.A. Election postponements also occurred in Dade County, Florida, in 1992 when 
Hurricane Andrew disrupted federal primaries, State v. Dade Cty., No. 80388, 1992 Fla. LEXIS 1563 (Fla. 
Aug. 31, 1992) (cited in FISCHER ET AL., supra note 9, at 9–10), and in Lewiston, Maine, in 1952 after a severe 
blizzard prevented the city from holding a local election, State v. Marcotte, 89 A.2d 308, 309 (Me. 1952) 
(cited in Goldfeder, supra note 9, at 530).  
 19 See infra Section I.B.  
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for activities that people were given a substantial amount of time to complete, 
such as voter registration and early voting. Moreover, particularly when no-
excuse absentee voting and lengthy early voting periods are available, the 
Constitution generally does not require courts to extend hours for individual 
polling locations due to more limited difficulties caused by run-of-the-mill 
problems such as inclement weather, power failures, or long lines.20 Indeed, 
the Constitution may even prohibit courts from extending polling place hours 
under such circumstances in the absence of statutory authorization.  
Finally, this Article maintains that states should reduce the need for such 
constitutional litigation by enacting election-specific emergency statutes to 
provide objective, specific, and clear rules in advance for adjusting the 
electoral process in response to both large-scale emergencies and unexpected 
difficulties at particular polling places. Such rules, effectively crafted under a 
Rawlsian veil of ignorance, would minimize both the appearance that election 
officials may be manipulating or exploiting a tragedy for political advantage, 
and their opportunity to do so.21  
These statutes should generally follow five main principles. First, they 
should disturb ordinarily applicable election rules and procedures to the least 
extent possible. Second, they should distinguish among three categories of 
election emergencies, including: (1) large-scale, long-term displacement of a 
substantial number of voters from an electoral jurisdiction, for which election 
cancellation is appropriate; (2) substantial, widespread disruption of an 
electoral jurisdiction’s normal operations which involve only limited or short-
term evacuations, or make it impossible, impracticable, or unreasonably 
dangerous to conduct an election as scheduled, for which election 
postponement is appropriate; and (3) problems relating to only a few polling 
places, for which election modification may be appropriate.   
Third, election emergency statutes should provide specific, objective 
criteria for determining when an election modification, postponement, or 
cancellation is necessary, as well as the precincts, voters, or political 
subdivisions to which such relief will apply. Officials’ decisions are less likely 
to be influenced by political considerations when constrained by reasonably 
specific criteria.  
 
 20 See infra Section II.F.  
 21 Cf. Michael T. Morley, The New Elections Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 100 (2016).   
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Fourth, election emergency statutes must balance protecting the integrity of 
the election (i.e., the “defensive” right to vote)22 with providing additional 
opportunities to vote (i.e., promoting the “affirmative” right to vote).  Such 
laws should facilitate voting while minimizing the extent to which election 
officials are required to rush and divert resources to implement major last-
minute changes. They should likewise be tailored to combat the potential for 
fraud. Finally, to the greatest extent possible, election emergency statutes 
should require election officials to delay, reschedule, or extend voting periods 
ahead of time, before votes are cast, rather than empowering them to extend 
polling place hours or hold makeup elections after voter turnout or preliminary 
results are known.   
Part I begins by presenting case studies of disasters that affected American 
elections throughout the early twenty-first century, focusing on the legal 
mechanisms election officials used to respond. Part II explores constitutional 
claims that are typically raised due to election emergencies, especially when 
state law fails to address the underlying issues. It explains that courts generally 
should not extend deadlines for voter registration or early voting periods, but 
may reschedule Election Day under extreme circumstances. In the absence of 
statutory authorization, courts generally lack authority to delay the closing time 
of particular polling places based on limited, small-scale disruptions.  
Part III demonstrates that election emergency statutes can alleviate the 
need for constitutional litigation. It contends that most laws that authorize 
governors to declare states of emergency do not confer sufficient power to 
respond to election emergencies. Statutes specifically addressing the impact of 
natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and other calamities on the electoral process 
are necessary, although many current election emergency laws have gaps that 
can lead to uncertainty and litigation. After reviewing other commentators’ 
suggestions, this Part presents recommendations for framing an adequate 
election emergency statute.  
While any particular disaster, terrorist attack, or other calamity is difficult 
to predict, it is almost certain that such emergencies will impact future 
elections. This Article analyzes the constitutional issues such disasters create 
so that courts are not rushed or pressured into injudiciously suspending state 
election laws, and sets forth principles for crafting election emergency statutes 
 
 22 See Michael T. Morley, Rethinking the Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN 
BANC 189, 192–93 (2014).   
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that can alleviate the need for such constitutional litigation and provide all 
voters with an opportunity to cast a ballot and have their voices heard.  
I. ELECTION EMERGENCIES IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
In the twenty-first century, terrorist attacks and natural disasters have 
already disturbed elections at all levels, including the September 11 attacks 
interrupting local primaries in New York in 2001, Hurricane Katrina delaying 
local elections in New Orleans in 2005, Hurricane Sandy disrupting a 
presidential election in New York and New Jersey in 2012, and Hurricane 
Matthew interfering with an impending presidential election throughout the 
southeastern United States in 2016.23 This Part explores how states responded 
to such emergencies and their legal authority for doing so.  
A. September 11 Attacks (New York City, 2001) 
New York State’s 2001 Democratic and Republican primary elections were 
scheduled for September 11.24 In New York City alone, nominations for 
mayor, city council, and “other city-wide and borough-wide offices” were at 
stake.25 The polls opened at 6 a.m.; less than three hours later, the first plane 
struck the World Trade Center.26  
The New York City Board of Elections contacted Justice Steven Fisher of 
the New York Supreme Court, Queens County, apparently on an ex parte basis, 
asking him to postpone the primaries within the city.27 He orally ordered the 
suspension of elections in New York City on the grounds that they could not 
be conducted in accordance with state law, since police had been called from 
polling locations to help evacuate Ground Zero.28 He also noted that 
“breakdowns in public transportation impeded voters and election inspectors in 
getting to the polls.”29 Fisher’s ruling was based on his “inherent judicial 
authority.”30   
 
 23 This Article builds upon and extends the work of Professor Jerry Goldfeder, who compiled case 
studies of election emergencies from throughout the twentieth century. See generally Goldfeder, supra note 9.  
 24 Id. at 525. 
 25 Id.  
 26 Id.  
 27 Id.; Primary Elections Are Cancelled, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 12, 2001, at 3.   
 28 Primary Elections Are Cancelled, supra note 27, at 3. 
 29 Id.  
 30 Mulroy, supra note 8, at 236.  
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Hours later, Governor George Pataki issued executive orders declaring a 
state of emergency31 and cancelling all primaries throughout the state.32 
Exercising his general emergency powers under the New York Executive 
Law,33 he suspended the state statute setting “the date and hours of voting for 
primary elections,” as well as all other legal provisions relating to the 
September 11 primaries that could “prevent, hinder or delay action necessary 
to cope with the disaster.”34 Although a New York statute specifically dealt 
with election emergencies, it applied only to general elections, not primaries.35 
No one filed judicial challenges to either Fisher’s court order or the Governor’s 
Executive Order.36  
Two days later, the state legislature enacted the Emergency Primary 
Election Rescheduling Act of 2001 (Primary Rescheduling Act).37 The act 
began with a legislative finding that “the primary election scheduled for 
September 11, 2001 was impossible owing to the imminent risk then posed to 
the health, safety and welfare of New York’s citizens.”38 The statute 
rescheduled the primaries for September 25, 2001—only two weeks after the 
attacks—and any runoffs for October 11, 2001.39  
The statute attempted to minimize the consequences of the disruption by 
providing that only people who were eligible to vote in the original primaries 
would be permitted to vote in the rescheduled elections.40 In general, New 
York law allows any eligible person who mails his voter registration form at 
least twenty-five days prior to an election to vote in that race.41 Under that 
provision, anyone who had submitted a registration form by August 17, 2001, 
could have voted in the original September 11 primaries, and therefore was 
 
 31 N.Y. Exec. Order No. 5.113 (Sept. 11, 2001), https://govt.westlaw.com/nycrr/Document/I4f078e3acd 
1711dda432a117e6e0f345?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryP
ageItem&contextData=(sc.Default).  
 32 N.Y. Exec. Order No. 5.113.1 (Sept. 11, 2001), https://govt.westlaw.com/nycrr/Document/I4f078e3 
acd1711dda432a117e6e0f345?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=Catego
ryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default). 
 33 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 29-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 2018) (“[T]he governor may by executive order 
temporarily suspend specific provisions of any statute . . . during a state disaster emergency, if compliance 
with such provisions would prevent, hinder, or delay action necessary to cope with the disaster.”). 
 34 N.Y. Exec. Order No. 5.113.1, supra note 32 (citing N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 8-100 (McKinney Supp. 
2018)).  
 35 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 3-108 (McKinney Supp. 2018).  
 36 Goldfeder, supra note 9, at 526.  
 37 Emergency Primary Election Rescheduling Act of 2001, ch. 298, 2001 N.Y. Laws 2616.  
 38 Id. § 1.  
 39 Id. § 3(1)–(2), 2001 N.Y. Laws at 2617.  
 40 Id. § 3(4).  
 41 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-210(3) (McKinney Supp. 2018).  
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eligible to participate in the rescheduled primaries. Had the legislature not 
frozen the voter rolls for the rescheduled primaries, people whose registrations 
were postmarked between August 18 and 30 also would have been permitted to 
participate. By determining voter eligibility based on the primary’s originally 
scheduled date, rather than the adjusted date, the state excluded those 
additional putative voters. The Primary Rescheduling Act permitted people to 
request absentee ballots, however, even if they had not submitted such requests 
for the original September 11 election.42  
Perhaps most controversially, the statute provided that, while absentee and 
military ballots that election officials had already received would be counted, 
votes cast on September 11 “at polling places shall not be counted.”43 People 
who already had voted in person on September 11—including in parts of the 
state where polling places did not lose any information as a result of the 
attacks—would be required to cast their ballots again. The law also required 
the State Board of Elections to issue public notices about both the rescheduled 
elections and the rules the legislature enacted for them.44 It concluded by 
declaring that candidates would not be required to file any additional pre-
primary campaign finance disclosures as a result of the rescheduling.45 
The delay in the election effectively extended the primary campaign, 
giving candidates an opportunity to inform the public about their views on both 
rebuilding the city and preventing future attacks. The New York City 
Campaign Finance Board, which oversees the city’s public financing system 
for local candidates,46 nevertheless refused to increase either the spending 
limits for candidates who received public funds or the amount of public 
funding made available to them.47 Candidates whose offices were damaged or 
 
 42 Emergency Primary Election Rescheduling Act, § 3(6), 2001 N.Y. Laws at 2617.  
 43 Id. § 3(5). 
 44 Id. § 3(3).  
 45 Id. § 5.  
 46 The Board’s offices were located at 40 Rector Street, “three blocks south of the World Trade Center.” 
N.Y. CITY CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., AN ELECTION INTERRUPTED . . . THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE PROGRAM AND THE 
2001 NEW YORK CITY ELECTIONS xvii (2002). The offices were evacuated immediately following the attacks 
and were inaccessible for the following seven weeks. Id. at x, xvii. Throughout that time, Board staff worked 
out of their homes and in temporary office space at Fordham University to address candidate inquiries, process 
disclosure forms, and make matching funds payments totaling over $10 million. Id. at x, xvii–xviii. 
 47 N.Y. City Campaign Fin. Bd., Advisory Opinion 2001-12, §§ 1, 3 (Sept. 20, 2001), https://www. 
nyccfb.info/law/advisory-opinions/2001-12-effect-new-york-state-legislature-decision-reschedule-new-york-
state/; see also N.Y. CITY CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., supra note 46, at 82, 154; Jan Witold Baran, Regulating Money 
in Politics: “We’ve Got It All Under Control,” 32 CUMB. L. REV. 591, 591 (2001).  
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destroyed in the attacks, however, were permitted to spend additional funds for 
new office space.48  
More troublingly,49 the Board prohibited candidates who had accepted 
public financing from spending any money between September 11 and the date 
of the rescheduled election on September 25,50 except to replicate for 
September 25 the “election day goods and services” they had already 
purchased for September 11.51 The Board explained that “all participating 
candidates assumed that spending for the primary election would end on 
September 11,” and most candidates had likely exhausted their campaign 
warchests by then.52 Because the public financing system was enacted to 
“level[] the playing field among candidates,” those “who had not reached their 
spending limit[s]” and retained leftover funds should not have an “advantage 
as a consequence of the events of September 11, 2001.”53 The Board 
concluded, “Given the extraordinary circumstances presented by the World 
Trade Center tragedy, the only legal, practical, and fair course of action is to 
limit all spending by participating candidates until September 25 except as 
otherwise described above.”54  
Both the state legislature and the New York City Campaign Finance Board 
attempted to implement an election postponement rather than a modification or 
cancellation. They sought to hold the circumstances of the September 11 
primaries as constant as possible in the undeniably vain hope that their 
outcomes would be unaffected by the delay until September 25. The 
rescheduled primaries were to involve the same candidates, the same voters, 
and even the same campaign spending as would have been the case on 
September 11. On the one hand, this is a commendable impulse: terrorists 
should not be permitted to derail the democratic process. Moreover, in light of 
both the relative brevity of the delay and the tremendous difficulty of 
organizing a new election so soon, it is understandable that election officials 
 
 48 N.Y. City Campaign Fin. Bd., Advisory Opinion 2001-12, § 3(B); Baran, supra note 47, at 592.  
 49 Editorial, Tomorrow’s Election, N.Y. POST, Sept. 24, 2001, at 40 (“[I]n an act of breathtaking 
arrogance, the Campaign Finance Board chose not to permit a campaign dialogue during the past two 
weeks.”); see also Robert Hardt Jr., Campaign Board Stops Cash Flow, N.Y. POST (Sept. 15, 2001, 4:00 AM), 
http://nypost.com/2001/09/15/campaign-board-stops-cash-flow/ (“The board’s action ensures that the 
postponed primary race . . . will stay below the radar screen in the wake of the terror attack on the city.”).  
 50 N.Y. City Campaign Fin. Bd., Advisory Opinion 2001-12, § 4.  
 51 Id. § 3(A).  
 52 Id.  
 53 Id.  
 54 Id.  
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would be reluctant to divert their attention and resources by processing new 
voter registration applications.  
On the other hand, September 11 changed the world. Voters’ fears, hopes, 
and priorities changed in a heartbeat. Rudy Giuliani’s adroit leadership in the 
aftermath of the attacks caused many voters to develop a newfound respect for 
him; his post-attack endorsement of Michael Bloomberg very well may have 
given Bloomberg the decisive margin of victory.55 The notion that the 
September 11 primaries could simply be transplanted to September 25 while 
holding everything constant was unavoidably flawed.   
Moreover, although the terrorist attacks thrust a host of compelling new 
policy issues onto the political agenda, the city’s campaign finance board 
effectively silenced publicly funded candidates by precluding them from 
spending any remaining funds,56 except to recreate their election day 
operations on September 25.57 By effectively prohibiting those candidates from 
campaigning, even if they had available funds to do so, the Board took its 
desire to preserve the status quo as it existed on September 11 to an 
unreasonable extreme. Candidates had both a right and a compelling interest in 
using all means at their disposal to inform voters about their positions on new 
security measures to prevent future terrorist attacks, rebuilding Manhattan, and 
other attendant issues.  
Attempting to preserve the state of political discourse as it existed prior to 
the September 11 attacks was not only futile and flatly against the public 
interest, but also likely unconstitutional. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme 
Court held, “Congress may engage in public financing of election campaigns 
and may condition acceptance of public funds on an agreement by the 
candidate to abide by specified expenditure limitations.”58 A complete 
prohibition on spending any funds in the two weeks immediately preceding an 
 
 55 See, e.g., Michael Cooper, Rich Are Different; They Get Elected, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/05/nyregion/rich-are-different-they-get-elected.html (“New York’s mayoral 
race was clearly influenced by the Sept. 11 attack on the World Trade Center, which made Mayor Rudolph W. 
Giuliani enormously popular and gave his endorsement of Mr. Bloomberg unusual weight . . . .”); John 
Harwood et al., Voters Hope Bloomberg’s Business Savvy Can Help Rejuvenate a Shellshocked City, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2001, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1005172732564406680 (noting that 
Bloomberg “reaped enormous benefit from a late endorsement by Mayor Giuliani, whose own popularity had 
soared as a result of his post September 11 leadership”).  
 56 N.Y. City Campaign Fin. Bd., Advisory Opinion 2001-12, § 4.  
 57 Id. § 3(A).    
 58 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976) (per curiam); see also Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 487 F. Supp. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (three-judge court), aff’d mem., 445 U.S. 955 
(1980).  
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election, however, would likely be deemed too great a burden on political 
communications to survive scrutiny. Additionally, one of the main reasons the 
Supreme Court approved public financing schemes is because they “facilitate 
communication by candidates with the electorate.”59 The Board’s restriction 
was flatly antithetical to that goal.  
The prohibition is even more objectionable because it was imposed in the 
middle of the election cycle—albeit in response to a tragic unforeseen 
disaster—after candidates had already decided to accept public financing. The 
Board’s express goal of prohibiting candidates from spending additional 
money out of fairness to those who had already exhausted their campaign 
funds also seems to violate a core tenet of campaign finance law. Buckley held, 
“[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of 
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to 
the First Amendment, which was designed ‘to secure the widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources’ . . . .”60 
Although the government has greater flexibility to impose restrictions on 
candidates who accept public financing,61 the Board’s concerns about fairness 
or equality are unlikely to warrant completely silencing any candidates. While 
candidates neither publicly opposed nor litigated the validity of these 
restrictions,62 the Board’s decision should not be seen as a model for adapting 
public financing restrictions to election emergencies.   
None of this is to criticize the good faith and dedication of the public 
servants who made these decisions. Having just suffered a devastating attack, 
they did their best in the face of unprecedented obstacles to make a series of 
difficult judgment calls to quickly organize a new election. They were forced 
to make such decisions on an ad hoc basis, however, because the state’s 
election emergency statute neither applied to primaries nor addressed all 
aspects of the issue, such as campaign finance.63 
 
 59 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91.  
 60 Id. at 48–49 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)). 
 61 See, e.g., id. at 95 (“[A]cceptance of public financing entails voluntary acceptance of an expenditure 
ceiling.”).  
 62 See N.Y. CITY CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., supra note 46, at xi; Maggie Haberman, Election Is on but 
Campaign Is Over, N.Y. POST (Sept. 16, 2001, 4:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2001/09/16/election-is-on-but-
campaign-is-over/.  
 63 See N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 3-108 (McKinney Supp. 2018). 
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B. Hurricane Katrina (New Orleans, 2005) 
Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, Louisiana, on August 29, 2005,64 
causing an estimated $85 billion in damage65 and displacing approximately 1.3 
million households.66 Nearly 60% of the population of New Orleans Parish, 
constituting between a quarter and half of the parish’s electorate, evacuated as 
a result of the hurricane.67  
State law allowed the governor to “suspend or delay any qualifying of 
candidates, early voting, or elections” when the secretary of state certified that 
an emergency existed.68 The electoral process was required to “resume or be 
rescheduled as soon thereafter as is practicable.”69 In September 2005—six 
months after the storm—the Louisiana Secretary of State certified that a state 
of emergency continued to exist in Jefferson and Orleans Parishes.70 Two 
hundred and two of New Orleans’s 442 voting precincts remained destroyed, 
and most of the city’s 2,300 election commissioners still had not reported in 
with the clerk.71 Accordingly, Governor Kathleen Blanco issued an executive 
order postponing all elections in those parishes for the rest of the year, 
including the October primary election and November general election in 
Jefferson Parish, and the November proposition election in Orleans Parish, 
“until such time as [they] may be rescheduled.”72 
 
 64 William P. Quigley, Katrina Voting Wrongs: Aftermath of Hurricane and Weak Enforcement Dilute 
African American Voting Rights in New Orleans, 14 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 49, 54 (2007). 
 65 Roger Pielke Jr., Hurricanes and Human Choice, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 31, 2012, 9:54 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204840504578089413659452702. 
 66 Voting and Democracy, supra note 10, at 1177. For discussions of the challenges in conducting 
elections following Hurricane Katrina, see Quigley, supra note 64; Roy, supra note 11, at 226 (advocating 
satellite voting locations to facilitate voting by displaced voters); Damian Williams, Note, Reconstructing 
Section 5: A Post-Katrina Proposal for Voting Rights Act Reform, 116 YALE L.J. 1116 (2007) (arguing that 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act hindered the rapid changes to election laws necessary to facilitate voting by 
displaced minorities following Hurricane Katrina by using pre-Katrina voting data as benchmarks for 
determining their validity, despite the widespread destruction and displacements the hurricane caused); see 
also Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, The Flexibility of Section 5 and the Politics of Disaster in Post-Katrina New 
Orleans, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 825, 837–43 (2013) (criticizing Louisiana election officials for resuming 
updating voter registration rolls, as required by state law, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18:192 (2012), in July 2007—
more than two years after Hurricane Katrina—on the grounds that thousands of voters still had not returned to 
New Orleans).  
 67 Roy, supra note 11, at 206.  
 68 LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:401.1(B) (2012).  
 69 Id. § 18:401.1(C).  
 70 See La. Exec. Order KBB 2005-36, § 1 (Sept. 14, 2005), http://www.doa.la.gov/osr/other/kbb05-
36.htm.  
 71 Quigley, supra note 64, at 63.  
 72 La. Exec. Order KBB 2005-36, § 1.  
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That December, ten months after Hurricane Katrina hit, the Secretary of 
State again certified that a state of emergency continued to exist in Orleans 
Parish.73 Governor Blanco issued another executive order postponing the 
primary, general, and proposition elections for Orleans County that had been 
scheduled for February and March 2006.74 It required those elections to be 
rescheduled “as soon as practicable.”75 Three lawsuits were filed challenging 
the Governor’s decision,76 but were largely mooted when the Governor agreed 
to hold elections by the end of April.77  
The legislature also enacted a package of laws to facilitate voting by 
Hurricane Katrina’s victims.78 One permanent provision empowers the 
secretary of state to propose an emergency voting plan to the state legislature 
when emergencies threaten impending elections.79 Legislators vote by mail on 
the plan, and it takes effect upon their approval.80  
A temporary provision, which expired in July 2006,81 designated the 
registrar’s office of any parish with a population of 100,000 or more as a 
“satellite voting” location at which any displaced person could vote.82 Another 
temporary provision, repealed in 2009,83 made it easier for displaced residents 
to vote by mail. Louisiana law generally requires a person who submits his 
voter registration form by mail to cast his first vote following that registration 
in person.84 The legislature allowed displaced people who first registered by 
mail between October 5, 2004, and September 25, 2005, to vote by mail in any 
elections through July 2006 without meeting that requirement.85  
 
 73 La. Exec. Order KBB 2005-96, § 1 (Dec. 9, 2005), http://www.doa.la.gov/osr/other/kbb05-96.htm.  
 74 Id.  
 75 Id.  
 76 John Hill, New Orleans Elections May Be Held in April, THE TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at 1A; see, e.g., 
Tisserand v. Blanco, No. 05-6487, 2006 WL 4045926, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 18, 2006); Wallace Petition, supra 
note 7, ¶¶ 60.g, 72–73 (alleging that the Governor’s decision to delay elections violated Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act because it had not been pre-cleared by the Department of Justice); see also Voters Sue 
Blanco to Schedule Elections, NEW ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS (Dec. 9, 2005), http://neworleanscitybusiness. 
com/blog/2005/12/09/voters-sue-blanco-to-schedule-elections. 
 77 Quigley, supra note 64, at 67; see Tisserand, 2006 WL 4045926, at *2.  
 78 Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 66, at 836. 
 79 LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:401.3(B) (2012).  
 80 Id. § 18:401.3(C)–(D).  
 81 Id. § 18:401.4(C) (2012).  
 82 Id. § 18:401.4(A); see Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 66, at 836–37; Roy, supra note 11, at 208.  
 83 See Act No. 369, § 1, 2009 La. Acts 2584, repealing LA. STAT. ANN. 18:433(A)(2) (2009). 
 84 LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:115(F)(1) (Supp. 2018).  
 85 Act No. 2, 2006 La. Acts 3014, codified at LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:115(F)(2)(d)(i) (expired June 14, 
2006).  
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Various left-wing groups sued, arguing that the state had not done enough 
to facilitate voting by displaced voters, who were disproportionately African-
American.86 One federal suit, Wallace v. Chertoff, alleged that holding 
elections in accordance with ordinary procedures would violate displaced 
residents’ right to vote, have a disparate impact on African-Americans, and 
dilute their vote.87 It also claimed that displaced residents’ voter registrations 
in Louisiana should not be cancelled simply because they registered to vote in 
another state or indicated that they wished to change their voting addresses 
when obtaining driver’s licenses in other states.88  
The Wallace plaintiffs sought an order requiring the State of Louisiana to 
grant displaced voters opportunities to vote “equal to or better than” the 
avenues that federal law89 establishes for military voters.90 They wished to 
compel the state to either allow displaced residents to vote “by mail, by 
facsimile, [or] via e-mail,” establish satellite polling locations in the states to 
which displaced residents had resettled, or instead pay for displaced residents 
to travel to New Orleans to vote.91 The plaintiffs requested additional wide-
ranging relief, as well, including orders suspending voter identification 
requirements;92 allowing any person who submitted her voter registration form 
by mail to vote by mail rather than having to appear in person, after the 
legislature’s emergency suspension of that requirement lapsed;93 and 
compelling FEMA to provide the state and candidates with displaced voters’ 
contact information and fund the reconstruction of voting facilities.94 
The Wallace plaintiffs also attempted to require the state to notify 
displaced residents about their voting rights “by mail, newspaper advertising, 
radio, television, internet, and/or other media,”95 and reinstate nearly all voters 
who had been removed from the rolls.96  The court repeatedly rejected most of 
 
 86 See, e.g., Wallace Petition, supra note 7, ¶¶ 4, 29–30, 42–45; Complaint ¶¶ 8, 76, 85, ACORN v. 
Blanco, No. 06-CV-00611 (E.D. La. Feb. 9, 2006), Doc. No. 1 [hereinafter ACORN Complaint]; see also 
Williams, supra note 66, at 1132 n.82 (discussing Wallace and ACORN). 
 87 Wallace Petition, supra note 7, ¶¶ 4, 66–69. 
 88 Id. ¶¶ 36–38, 79, 82. 
 89 Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301–20311 (2012) (formerly 
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff, et seq.). 
 90 Wallace Petition, supra note 7, ¶ 74. 
 91 Id. ¶ 81.  
 92 Id. ¶ 83.  
 93 Id. ¶ 84.  
 94 Id. ¶¶ 4.a, 4.c, 75, 75.a, 78, 84.b–84.c.  
 95 Id. ¶¶ 80, 84.a.  
 96 Id. ¶¶ 79, 82.  
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the plaintiffs’ claims for relief.97 The state agreed, however, to allow the 
plaintiffs to station monitors to observe polling locations and the tabulation of 
ballots, and the case was ultimately dismissed by joint stipulation.98  
Another lawsuit, filed by ACORN, claimed that the Secretary of State’s 
Emergency Plan violated displaced residents’ constitutional right to vote and 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.99 The plaintiffs sought to force the state to 
mail unsolicited absentee ballots to as many displaced residents as possible, 
establish satellite voting locations in other states where displaced residents 
could vote in person, and permit displaced residents to vote without showing 
proper identification.100 The court dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ claims with 
prejudice.101 ACORN subsequently disbanded over numerous scandals,102 
including filing hundreds of thousands of fraudulent voter registration forms 
and attempting to assist other illegal activities.103 Other plaintiffs attempted to 
block Louisiana’s emergency adjustments to its voting procedures on the 
grounds they violated Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, but courts rejected 
those claims, as well.104  
 
 97 Order at 2, Wallace v. Chertoff, No. 05-5519 (E.D. La. June 13, 2006), Doc. No. 129 (dismissing 
case); see also Order at 4, Wallace v. Chertoff, No. 05-5519 (E.D. La. Feb. 23, 2006), Doc. No. 66 (denying 
motion for preliminary injunction); Order at 2, Wallace v. Chertoff, No. 05-5519 (E.D. La. Mar. 7, 2006), Doc. 
No. 85 (dismissing claims); Order at 2, Wallace v. Chertoff, No. 05-5519 (E.D. La. Mar. 29, 2006), Doc. No. 
101 (denying motion to reconsider); Roy, supra note 11, at 209.  
 98 Order at 2, Wallace v. Chertoff, No. 05-5519, supra note 97. 
 99 ACORN Complaint, supra note 86, ¶¶ 8, 76, 85. 
 100 Id. at 19.  
 101 Judgment, ACORN v. Blanco, No. 06-CV-00611 (E.D. La. June 16, 2006), Doc. No. 62 (dismissing 
case with prejudice); see also Order at 4, ACORN v. Blanco, No. 06-CV-00611 (E.D. La. Feb. 23, 2006), Doc. 
No. 16 (denying motion for preliminary injunction); Order at 2, ACORN v. Blanco, No. 06-CV-00611 (E.D. 
La. Mar. 7, 2006), Doc. No. 40 (dismissing claims); Order at 2, ACORN v. Blanco, No. 06-CV-00611 (E.D. 
La. Mar. 29, 2006), Doc. No. 49 (denying motion to reconsider). 
 102 Ian Urbina, ACORN to Shut All Its Offices by April 1, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/23/us/23acorn.html; After Video Scandal, ACORN Plans to Fold, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS, Mar. 23, 2010, at A2.  
 103 Katherine Kersten, Opinion, Worst Trouble with ACORN Is at the Polls; Nationally, Its Voter 
Registration Is Often Fraudulent. So What About Here?, STAR TRIB., Sept. 27, 2009, at 5OP; Vote-Theft, 
ACORN-Style, N.Y. POST (Oct. 18, 2008, 7:15 AM), http://nypost.com/2008/10/18/vote-theft-acorn-style/; see, 
e.g., Steve Friess, ACORN Charged in Voter Registration Fraud Case in Nevada, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/05/us/05acorn.html; Heather Heidelbaugh, The ACORN Way; Its Partisan 
Voter Registration Drive Probably Violated Pennsylvania Election Law, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 22, 
2009, at B-7.  
 104 See Segue v. Louisiana, No. 07-5221, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74428, at *2–3 (E.D. La. Oct. 3, 2007); 
see also Wallace Petition, supra note 7, ¶¶ 63–65. Commentators have argued that Section 5 hinders efforts to 
ensure racial justice in the aftermath of crises and have proposed alternate approaches to assessing 
retrogression under such circumstances. Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 66, at 830, 854–56 (arguing that, when 
a state suspends its laws following a disaster, it should be required to satisfy preclearance requirements before 
implementing them again); Williams, supra note 66, at 1141, 1143–44 (arguing that in the wake of a disaster, a 
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Thus, Louisiana responded to the mass displacements and widespread 
destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina through election cancellations. The 
Secretary of State completely cancelled elections in Jefferson and New Orleans 
Parishes well before they began, until more displaced residents returned and 
the infrastructure necessary to conduct elections could be restored. The 
rescheduled elections did not attempt to hold anything constant from the 
originally scheduled dates, as in New York following the September 11 
attacks, but rather were treated as completely new, independent events.  
C. Hurricane Sandy (New Jersey and New York, 2012) 
Hurricane Sandy hit the Northeast barely one week before the hotly 
contested November 6, 2012, presidential election.105 New York City ordered 
the evacuation of 370,000 people from low-lying areas of Manhattan and 
Brooklyn, shut down its public transit system, closed public schools, and 
opened shelters; the New York Stock Exchange, Broadway, and the United 
Nations all closed, as well.106 New Jersey evacuated residents from its barrier 
islands and closed Atlantic City casinos.107  
The storm caused billions of dollars in damage.108 It made landfall in 
Atlantic City around 8:00 p.m. on October 29.109 Approximately three-quarters 
of the city were thrust underwater, and parts of the boardwalk were 
destroyed.110 “Water as much as eight feet deep coursed through some streets, 
leaving them impassable. Heavy rains and sustained winds of more than 40 
miles an hour, with gusts of more than 60 miles an hour, battered the city.”111 
The hurricane flooded Hoboken and several other suburbs; wiped out 
“[a]musement parks, arcades and restaurants” throughout the Jersey Shore; and 
 
covered jurisdiction’s actual voting laws should not be used as a benchmark for measuring retrogression, but 
rather a hypothetical set of voting requirements fabricated by the court based on input from local stakeholders). 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Shelby County v. Holder prevents enforcement of Section 5 for the foreseeable 
future, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), largely mooting such concerns.  
 105 Gene Cherry, Massive Hurricane Sandy Takes Aim at East Coast, REUTERS, Oct. 26, 2012, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-storm-sandy-hurricane/massive-hurricane-sandy-takes-aim-at-east-coast-
idUSBRE89N16J20121027. 
 106 James Barron, Sharp Warnings as Hurricane Churns In, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2012/10/29/us/east-coast-braces-for-severe-storm-surge.html.  
 107 Id.  
 108 David M. Halbfinger, New Jersey Reels from Storm’s Thrashing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/01/nyregion/new-jersey-continues-to-cope-with-hurricane-sandy.html. 
 109 Thomas Kaplan & N.R. Kleinfield, Empty of Gamblers and Full of Water, Atlantic City Reels, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/30/nyregion/storm-overwhelms-atlantic-city.html? 
mtrref=undefined&gwh=0340ACBB5B886B71113AE5534D377B07&gwt=pay.  
 110 Id.  
 111 Id.  
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destroyed “entire neighborhoods.”112 Over 2 million New Jersey residents113 
and 6 million New York residents114 were left without power and 
approximately 161,000 families were displaced.115 Losses were estimated to be 
as high as $50 billion,116 and hundreds of polling places were destroyed, left 
without power, or otherwise rendered inaccessible.117  
On October 27, 2012, two days before Sandy hit, New Jersey Governor 
Chris Christie proclaimed a state of emergency.118 The proclamation 
recognized that the impending storm could “cause outages of power, impede 
transportation . . . [and] make it difficult or impossible for the citizens [of New 
Jersey] to obtain the necessities of life, as well as essential services such as 
police, fire, and first aid.”119 Pursuant to the state’s general emergency 
statute,120 he authorized the heads of executive agencies to “waive, suspend, or 
modify” any rules that “would be detrimental to the public welfare during this 
emergency,” notwithstanding any other provision of law.121   
A few days later, after the storm hit, the state’s chief election official, 
Lieutenant Governor Kim Guadagno, issued a series of six directives “to 
address election-day polling issues that have arisen as a result of Hurricane 
Sandy.”122 On November 1, she extended the deadline by which clerks had to 
receive mailed requests for mail-in ballots from Tuesday, October 30123 to 
Friday, November 2;124 ordered all election offices to remain open over the 
 
 112 Halbfinger, supra note 108.  
 113 James Barron, Storm Barrels Through Region, Leaving Destructive Path, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/30/us/hurricane-sandy-churns-up-east-coast.html.  
 114 Halbfinger, supra note 108.  
 115 Ted Sherman, Emergency Voting Measures During Hurricane Sandy Violated N.J. Law, Inviting 
Fraud, Study Finds, NJ.COM (Oct. 24, 2014, 10:15 AM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/10/ 
emergency_voting_measures_during_hurricane_sandy_violated_nj_law_inviting_fraud_study_finds.html.  
 116 Mary Williams Walsh & Nelson D. Schwartz, Estimate of Economic Losses Now Up to $50 Billion, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/business/estimate-of-economic-losses-now-
up-to-50-billion.html?mtrref=undefined&gwh=D2EA4F9AECA0704D40559557CB7F61B8&gwt=pay.  
 117 Zach Montellaro, Why You (Still) Can’t Vote Online, ATLANTIC (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www. 
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/why-you-still-cant-vote-online/459183/; see also Sherman, supra note 
115.  
 118 N.J. Exec. Order No. 104 (Oct. 27, 2012), http://nj.gov/infobank/circular/eocc104.pdf.  
 119 Id. at 1.  
 120 See N.J. STAT. ANN. app. A:9-45 (West 2006); see also id. app. A:9-47. 
 121 N.J. Exec. Order No. 104, § 6.  
 122 Kim Guadagno, Lieutenant Governor & Sec’y of State, State of N.J., Directive Easing Restrictions on 
Voters in the Aftermath of Hurricane Sandy (Nov. 1, 2012), http://nj.gov/state/elections/2012-results/signed-
directive-hurricane-sandy-110212.pdf.  
 123 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:63-3(b) (West 2014). State law also allowed voters to request mail-in 
ballots in person up through 3:00 p.m. the day before an election. Id. § 19:63-3(d).  
 124 Guadagno, supra note 122, ¶ 1. 
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weekend before Election Day and extend their normal operating hours;125 and 
required local election officials to confirm that polling places remained 
accessible and had power.126 The directive also waived residency requirements 
for local election board members, restrictions on polling place locations, and 
certain restrictions on ballot couriers for voters who had relocated to state-run 
shelters.127 Two days later, Guadagno directed election officials to notify 
voters of any changes to their polling locations, and further disseminate such 
information through newspaper notices, public service announcements, and on 
their websites.128  
The same day, Guadagno issued two other directives that expanded 
opportunities to vote, in apparent violation of New Jersey law.129 One order 
authorized any voter displaced by Hurricane Sandy to cast a provisional ballot 
at any polling place in the state.130 Election officials were directed to transmit 
those provisional ballots to the voters’ respective home counties.131 Only votes 
for offices for which a person was entitled to vote would be counted.132 In 
other words, a voter who took advantage of this option by presenting to vote at 
a polling place other than her assigned location would be limited to voting only 
for offices, such as President and U.S. Senator, that appeared on the ballots for 
both her assigned location and the polling place at which she wished to vote.133  
This order appears to be invalid under New Jersey law. State law allowed a 
voter who moved within her county without updating her voter registration 
record and then attempted to vote at the polling place for her new address to 
cast a provisional ballot.134 It did not permit a person to cast a provisional 
 
 125 Id. ¶¶ 2–3.  
 126 Id. ¶ 4.  
 127 Id. ¶¶ 5–7.  
 128 Kim Guadagno, Lieutenant Governor & Sec’y of State, State of N.J., Directive Regarding Notice and 
Communication (Nov. 3, 2012), http://nj.gov/state/elections/2012-results/directive-notice-communication.pdf.  
 129 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS CLINIC, RUTGERS LAW SCHOOL-NEWARK, THE PERFECT STORM: VOTING 
IN NEW JERSEY IN THE WAKE OF SUPERSTORM SANDY 3, 40 (2014) [hereinafter THE PERFECT STORM]; Larry 
Greenemeier, Election 2012: Sandy Prompts N.J. to Extend E-Mail Voting, SCI. AM. (Nov. 5, 2012), 
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/election-2012-sandy-prompts-n-j-to-extend-e-mail-voting/. 
 130 Kim Guadagno, Lieutenant Governor & Sec’y of State, State of N.J., Directive Expanding Ability of 
Displaced Voters to Vote (Nov. 3, 2012), http://nj.gov/state/elections/2012-results/directive-displaced-
voters.pdf.  
 131 Id. ¶ 1(a)–(b).  
 132 Id. ¶ 1(c)(i)–(ii).  
 133 See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.  
 134 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:53C-1(b), 19:53C-3(b)–(c) (West 2014). A voter also may cast a provisional 
ballot if her registration information does not appear in the records of the polling place for the address at which 
she claims to be registered, she votes after a polling place’s designated closing time pursuant to a court order, 
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ballot outside of the county at which she was registered to vote.135 Moreover, 
New Jersey did not have an election emergency statute authorizing the 
governor or lieutenant governor to waive election-related laws, and the state’s 
general emergency statutes did not empower the governor to suspend, ignore, 
or violate many types of state laws.136 Thus, Guadagno’s decision to 
unilaterally authorize provisional voting in circumstances not permitted by the 
Election Code is highly dubious.  
She concurrently issued another order137 allowing voters displaced by 
Hurricane Sandy to also take advantage of special voting procedures state law 
established for military and overseas voters.138 The order permitted displaced 
voters to email or fax requests for mail-in ballots to their respective county 
clerks until 5:00 p.m. on Election Day.139 After confirming that an applicant 
was a qualified voter, the clerk was required to “electronically send” a mail-in 
ballot, along with a “waiver of secrecy form . . . by the method chosen by the 
voter (email/fax).”140  Voters were permitted to return their completed ballots 
by email or fax by 8:00 p.m. on Election Day,141 along with the waiver of 
secrecy form relinquishing their right to a secret ballot (since election officials 
would be able to see which candidates they voted for).142  
Numerous commentators immediately attacked Guadagno’s order, in 
particular because it did not provide for an auditable paper trail of votes cast,143 
 
she votes at a polling place without displaying a statutorily required form of identification, or she requested a 
mail-in ballot but did not cast it. Id. §§ 19:53C-1(b), 19:53C-3(g)–(j).  
 135 Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:53C-3(d)–(e) (providing that a voter may not be given a provisional ballot 
in her current county of residence if she is registered to vote in another county).  
 136 See N.J. STAT. ANN. app. A:9-34, 9-45. The governor may suspend or ignore motor vehicle and other 
regulatory laws during emergencies. Id. at app. A:9-47 (“The Governor is authorized to provide . . . that 
any . . . traffic act provision or any other regulatory provision of law, the enforcement of which will be 
detrimental to the public welfare during any . . . emergency, shall be suspended . . . .”).  
 137 Kim Guadagno, Lieutenant Governor & Sec’y of State, State of N.J., Directive Regarding Email 
Voting and Mail-in Ballots for Displaced Voters (Nov 3, 2012), http://nj.gov/state/elections/2012-
results/directive-email-voting.pdf.  
 138 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:59-1–19:59-16 (West Supp. 2017); see also Uniformed and Overseas Citizens 
Absentee Voting Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301–20311 (2012), as amended by National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2010 (Subtitle H), Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 575–589, 123 Stat. 2190, 2318–35 (Oct. 28, 2009).  
 139 Guadagno, supra note 137.  
 140 Id.  
 141 Id.  
 142 Id.  
 143 See, e.g., Greenemeier, supra note 129 (“The central point of contention is that whereas military 
absentee voters are required by law to mail a paper ballot in addition to voting by e-mail or fax, Guadagno’s 
directive makes no mention of a backup paper trail.”); Herb Jackson & Anthony Campisi, Sandy: An Election 
Day Like No Other, NORTHJERSEY.COM, http://www.northjersey.com/story/weather/2017/10/05/archive-
sandy-election-day-like-no-other/735510001/ (last updated Oct. 5, 2017, 12:14 PM).  
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which the statute governing military and overseas voters requires.144 Guadagno 
later claimed that voters who cast electronic ballots would be required to mail 
hard copies of their ballots to the appropriate county clerk, but none of her 
orders actually required this and “many county clerks . . . were unaware” of 
any such requirement.145 Moreover, it is unclear whether election officials 
would count electronic ballots from voters who failed to submit hard copies as 
well.146  
This order also extended the deadline for receiving ballots from voters who 
chose to mail them in, rather than casting them electronically. Under state law, 
ballots had to be received by an appropriate election official by Election Day—
November 6, 2012—to be valid.147 Guadagno’s directive provided that mail-in 
ballots had to be postmarked by November 5, but election officials did not 
have to receive them until November 19.148 Thus, the outcomes of tight races 
might not be known for at least two weeks after the election. She issued a 
subsequent order extending the deadlines for certifications of election results, 
recounts, and election contests.149    
Over 50,000 ballots were submitted by electronic mail or fax.150 Clerks 
lacked the infrastructure and personnel necessary to timely respond to the 
deluge of electronically submitted ballot requests and completed ballots.151 In 
 
 144 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:59-15(a) (West Supp. 2017) (“Immediately after a copy of an overseas voter’s 
or overseas federal election voter’s voted ballot . . . has been transmitted by electronic means to the appropriate 
county board of elections . . . [that person] shall place the original voted ballot in a secure envelope . . . and 
send [it, along with a secrecy waiver,] by air mail to the appropriate county board of elections.”). Although 
state law does not directly address the issue, it appears that if military or overseas voters fail to submit a hard 
copies of their ballots, or if the hard copies they submit do not match their electronic ballots, the electronic 
ballots still count. See id. § 19:59-14 (West Supp. 2017) (specifying the circumstances under which a military 
or overseas voter’s electronically submitted ballot will be accepted as valid and omitting any requirement that 
the voter mail a hard copy of it); cf. § 19:59-15(a), (d) (requiring military and overseas voters to submit hard 
copies of ballots they cast electronically and identifying steps election officials must take if they do not receive 
such a hard copy or a voter’s hard copy does not match their electronic ballot, without specifying that the 
electronic ballot will not be counted).  
 145 Christopher Baxter, Rutgers Seeks Info on Handling of Post-Sandy Ballots, STAR LEDGER, Nov. 28, 
2012, at 021; see also Jackson & Campisi, supra note 143.  
 146 Cf. supra note 144.  
 147 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:63-18 (West 2014).  
 148 Guadagno, supra note 137.  
 149 Kim Guadagno, Lieutenant Governor & Sec’y of State, State of N.J., Directive Regarding the 
Certification of Election Results for the November 2012 General Election (Nov. 9, 2012), 
http://nj.gov/state/elections/2012-results/directive-certification-of-results.pdf.  
 150 See THE PERFECT STORM, supra note 129, at 17; Montellaro, supra note 117. 
 151 Christopher Baxter, Voting by E-mail, Fax Spurs Massive Jam-Ups in Jersey, Decision to Extend 
Election, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 7, 2012, at 001; Amy Ellis Nutt, Chaos at County Clerks’ Offices May 
Leave Voters Waiting for Results, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 7, 2012, at 012. 
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one county, 1,500 electronic requests for ballots remained pending, apparently 
unfulfilled, the day after the election.152 Other counties were unable to accept 
requests because their e-mail inboxes were full or their fax machines ran out of 
paper or toner.153 One election official had voters transmit ballot requests to his 
personal e-mail address.154  
Due to the deluge of electronic voting requests and the substantial number 
of displaced people unable to vote electronically, the ACLU of New Jersey 
orally filed an emergency petition on Election Day,155 asking the Superior 
Court for Essex County to require election officials to accept Federal Write-in 
Absentee Ballots (FWABs), which are essentially blank pieces of paper on 
which voters may write the names of the candidates or even political parties for 
which they wish to vote.156 Federal law requires states to accept FWABs from 
military and overseas voters who timely request absentee ballots, but do not 
receive them.157 The court rejected the petition.158 It nevertheless directed 
county clerks to accept renewed ballot requests from voters who had attempted 
to request absentee ballots by Guadango’s deadline, but were unsuccessful due 
to county clerks’ equipment failures, until noon on Friday, November 9.159 
During oral argument on the emergency petition, Judge Walter Koprowski 
“acknowledged questions about the constitutionality of [Guadagno’s] directive, 
but said those issues were not for him to decide.”160  
Pursuant to the court’s order, Guadagno issued a directive on Election Day, 
which reiterated that the deadline for submitting initial requests for absentee 
ballots was 5:00 p.m. that day, and required clerks to continue processing 
timely submitted requests through noon on November 9.161 The directive 
 
 152 THE PERFECT STORM, supra note 129, at 17.  
 153 Id. at 18; Sherman, supra note 115; see also Kim Zetter, Hotmail Takes On Election Duties as 
Servers in New Jersey Crash, WIRED (Nov. 6, 2012, 2:04 PM), https://www.wired.com/2012/11/new-jersey-
email-fai/. 
 154 Zetter, supra note 153.  
 155 See E-mail from Alexander Shalom, Senior Staff Attorney, Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.J., to 
author (July 2, 2017, 7:17 PM) (on file with author).  
 156 See 52 U.S.C. § 20303(c) (2012); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:59-2(j) (West 2017).  
 157 52 U.S.C. § 20303(a)(1), (b)(2)–(3). New Jersey law does not expressly incorporate federal law’s 
restrictions on military and overseas voters’ use of FWABs. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:59-14, 19:59-15(a) 
(West 2017).  
 158 Order ¶¶ 1–3, Ertel v. Essex Cty. Bd. of Elections (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 7, 2012), 
https://www.aclu-nj.org/files/8913/5238/9713/2012_11_06_ORDER.pdf.  
 159 Id. ¶¶ 4–5.  
 160 Baxter, supra note 151, at 001.  
 161 Kim Guadagno, Lieutenant Governor & Sec’y of State, State of N.J., Directive to Accommodate 
Processing of Electronically Transmitted Mail-in Ballot Applications and to Preserve Displaced Voters’ Right 
to Vote (Nov. 6, 2012), http://nj.gov/state/elections/2012-results/directive-volume-and-extension.pdf. 
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required voters to mail or fax completed ballots by 8:00 p.m. on November 
9.162 It further reiterated that county boards of election were required to verify 
that a voter had not already voted in person or by mail before counting an 
electronically submitted ballot.163  
Guadagno’s emergency orders led to serious problems with a public 
referendum on reducing rent control restrictions in Hoboken, New Jersey.164 
Under her orders, Hoboken voters who requested and cast ballots 
electronically165 were permitted to vote on the public question.166 Voters who 
instead cast provisional ballots in person at polling locations outside of 
Hoboken167 did not have the opportunity to vote on it since the question did not 
appear on the ballots those polling locations distributed.168 The New Jersey 
Superior Court, Appellate Division noted that her directives, “however well-
intentioned, failed to advise voters” of this important “difference [in] their 
[]ability to vote on any of the Public Questions on the Hoboken ballot.”169  
Based on Election Day vote tallies, the rent control question failed by fifty-
three votes out of more than 16,000 cast on it.170 An election contest was 
brought challenging this result on the grounds that 114 Hoboken voters who 
cast provisional ballots at polling places outside the city pursuant to 
Guadagno’s order were deprived of the opportunity to vote on the question.171 
Under New Jersey law, a court generally must “order a re-vote on a public 
question where eligible voters have been denied access to vote on that 
question, provided the number of voters was sufficient to change the result of 
the election.”172 The Appellate Division emphasized that displaced voters had 
not been informed that provisional ballots in alternate polling locations did not 
 
 162 Id. ¶ 4.  
 163 Id. ¶ 5.  
 164 In re Contest of the Nov. 6, 2012 Election Results for the City of Hoboken, Public Question No. 2, 
No. A-3218-12T3, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2250 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 11, 2013) 
[hereinafter In re Election Contest]; see Hoboken Public Question No. 2, Barbara A. Netchert, Hudson Cty. 
Clerk, County of Hudson General Election Sample Ballot (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.hudsoncountyclerk.org/ 
elections/2012%20General%20Election%20Sample%20Ballots/ Hbkn%20Smpl%20f7.pdf.  
 165 Guadagno, supra note 137.  
 166 In re Election Contest, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2250, at *6.  
 167 Guadagno, supra note 130. 
 168 In re Election Contest, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2250, at *6.  
 169 Id.  
 170 Barbara A. Netchert, Hudson Cty. Clerk, 2012 General Election Totals, “Hoboken Public Question 
No. 2,” http://www.hudsoncountyclerk.org/elections/SOV%20Amended%20Municipal%20Total%20General 
%20Election%2011_6_2012.pdf.  
 171 In re Election Contest, 2013 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2250, at *6. 
 172 Id. at *5 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:29-1(e) (West 2014)).  
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provide an opportunity to vote on Hoboken’s public questions.173 The court 
added, “[W]e perceive a significant potential for manipulation of the vote if, in 
a year where there are contentious local election issues, voters can be directed 
by [an] emergency directive to remote polling places where they will be 
provided with ballots that do not include the local questions or candidates.”174 
It ordered that the public question “be placed on the November 5, 2013 
ballot.”175  
The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law termed New Jersey’s 
election a “catastrophe.”176 The Constitutional Law Clinic at Rutgers Law 
School-Newark issued a report after the election severely criticizing 
Guadagno’s decision to allow internet voting.177 It claimed that her last-minute 
order confused and overwhelmed county clerks and “left votes vulnerable to 
online hacking.”178 Counties lacked the infrastructure necessary to ensure that 
voting was secure, voters’ information was protected, and results could not be 
manipulated.179 The report concluded, “Internet voting should never be 
permitted, especially in emergencies when governmental infrastructure is 
already compromised.”180  
New York took a very different approach toward preserving its citizens’ 
right to vote.181 On October 26, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo declared a “State 
Disaster Emergency” for all counties within the state based on Sandy’s 
potential to cause “widespread power outages and flooding, [as well as] 
damage to homes, apartments, businesses, and public and private property.”182 
The order directed state agencies “to take appropriate action to protect State 
 
 173 Id. at *8.  
 174 Id. at *9.  
 175 Id. at *10. The public question, redesignated as Hoboken Public Question number 1, was defeated at 
the November 2013 election by 122 votes. Barbara A. Netchert, Hudson Cty. Clerk, 2013 General Election 
Totals, “Hoboken Public Question No. 1,” http://www.hudsoncountyclerk.org/SOV_GENERAL% 
20ELECTION%20DISTRICT%20CANVASS%2011_5_2013.pdf.  
 176 Mitchell Landsberg, Voting Rights Coalition Describes Problems in N.J., Other States, L.A. TIMES 
(Nov. 6, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/06/news/la-pn-voting-rights-problems-election-day-
20121106.  
 177 THE PERFECT STORM, supra note 129, at 83.  
 178 Id. For discussions of the perils of internet voting, see Jeremy Epstein, Internet Voting, Security, and 
Privacy, 19 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 885, 906 (2011) (“Blank ballot distribution may be feasible, 
especially with dedicated systems, but other types of Internet voting are too risky to be used for public 
elections.”); Montellaro, supra note 117. 
 179 THE PERFECT STORM, supra note 129, at 83; see also Zetter, supra note 153. 
 180 THE PERFECT STORM, supra note 129, at 83. 
 181 Greenemeier, supra note 129.  
 182 N.Y. Exec. Order No. 47 (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/ 
files/atoms/files/EO47_0.pdf.  
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property and to assist affected local governments and individuals in responding 
to and recovering from this disaster, and to provide such other assistance as 
necessary to protect the public health and safety.”183  
The day before Election Day, Cuomo issued another executive order 
focusing specifically on the impending election.184 The order recognized that 
“Hurricane Sandy has struck a deadly blow, destroying lives, countless 
houses[,] and businesses[;] displacing thousands of New Yorkers from their 
homes[;] disrupting transportation, the flow of commerce[,] and daily life[;] 
and complicating even the simplest and most routine acts of living.”185 Cuomo 
used his statutory authority to suspend state laws during declared 
emergencies186 to permit voters registered in New York City or other counties 
within the federally declared disaster zone187 to cast provisional ballots (called 
“affidavit ballots”) at any polling location,188 not just the ones at which they 
were registered.189 As in New Jersey, voters would have their votes counted for 
any races on the provisional ballots for which they were legally eligible to 
vote.190 The order further directed each board of elections to transmit such 
provisional ballots to the counties in which the voters who cast them were 
registered.191 The Governor did not authorize internet voting, ostensibly on the 
grounds it was too insecure.192 
New Jersey and New York’s responses to Hurricane Sandy are examples of 
election modifications. Rather than postponing or cancelling the elections, both 
states modified the rules to varying extents to facilitate voting by displaced 
 
 183 Id.  
 184 N.Y. Exec. Order No. 62 (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/ 
atoms/files/EO62_0.pdf.  
 185 Id.  
 186 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 29-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 2018).  
 187 By Election Day, the federal government had declared the following counties to be disaster zones: 
Bronx, Kings, Nassau, New York, Queens, Richmond, and Suffolk. See New York; Major Disaster and 
Related Determinations, 77 Fed. Reg. 69,647, 69,648 (Nov. 20, 2012) (discussing the President’s October 30, 
2012 declaration of major disaster for the State of New York and identifying “adversely affected” counties); 
New York; Amendment No. 2 to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration, 77 Fed. Reg. 67,015, 67,015 (Nov. 7, 
2012) (designating two additional New York counties as disaster areas, effective November 2); New York; 
Amendment No. 3 to Notice of a Major Disaster Declaration, 77 Fed. Reg. 69,646, 69,646–47 (Nov. 20, 2012) 
(reiterating list of New York counties designated as disaster areas as of November 3); see also N.Y. Exec. Ord. 
No. 47 (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO47_0.pdf; New 
York Hurricane Sandy (DR-4085), FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, https://gis.fema.gov/maps/dec_4085. 
pdf (last updated Nov. 19, 2012). 
 188 N.Y. Exec. Ord. No. 62, supra note 188. 
 189 Cf. N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 8-302(3)(e)(ii), (3-a), 9-209(2)(a)(i)(E)(iii) (McKinney Supp. 2018). 
 190 N.Y. Exec. Ord. No. 62, supra note 188.  
 191 Id. 
 192 Greenemeier, supra note 129.  
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voters. New Jersey’s modifications were more extensive, incorporating a last-
minute decision to allow voting by fax and e-mail, although many county 
clerks’ offices apparently lacked both the hardware and personnel necessary to 
process those electronically submitted ballots.  
D. Hurricane Matthew (Florida and Georgia, 2016) 
The most recent major election emergency occurred approximately one 
month before the 2016 presidential election, when Hurricane Matthew 
threatened to ravage the eastern seaboard of the United States. As the hurricane 
prepared to make its way up the coast, the Governors of Florida,193 Georgia,194 
North Carolina,195 and South Carolina196 declared states of emergency; 
hundreds of thousands of people evacuated Florida and South Carolina.197 The 
hurricane passed Florida on October 6 and 7, continuing north along the coast 
over the following days.198 It flooded several coastal communities throughout 
the Southeast, including St. Augustine and Savannah, causing billions in 
damage199 and leaving over a million people without power.200  
 
 193 Fla. Exec. Ord. No. 16-230 (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/SLG-
BIZHUB16100301110.pdf.  
 194 Ga. Exec. Ord. No. 10.04.16.02 (Oct. 4, 2016), https://gov.georgia.gov/sites/gov.georgia.gov/files/ 
related_files/document/10.04.16.02.pdf; see also Ga. Exec. Ord. No. 10.11.16.01 (Oct. 11, 2016), 
https://gov.georgia.gov/sites/gov.georgia.gov/files/related_files/document/10.11.16.01.pdf; Ga. Exec. Ord. No. 
10.05.16.02 (Oct. 5, 2016), https://gov.georgia.gov/sites/gov.georgia.gov/files/related_files/document/10.05. 
16.02.pdf (declaring state of emergency in additional counties).  
 195 N.C. Exec. Ord. No. 129 (Oct. 26, 2012), https://www2.ncdps.gov/cit/ExecutiveOrders/EO129_ 
SOETropicalStormSandy.pdf; see also N.C. Exec. Ord. No. 131 (Oct. 29, 2012), https://www2.ncdps.gov/cit/ 
ExecutiveOrders/EO131WinterStorm.pdf.  
 196 S.C. Exec. Ord. No. 2016-26 (Oct. 4, 2016), http://dc.statelibrary.sc.gov/bitstream/handle/10827/ 
23222/GOV_Executive_Order_2016-26.pdf; see also S.C. Exec. Ord. No. 2016-39 (Oct. 18, 2016), 
http://dc.statelibrary.sc.gov/bitstream/handle/10827/23436/GOV_Executive_Order_2016-39.pdf.  
 197 J.D. Gallop et al., Matthew Marching Closer to U.S. Coast, FLA. TODAY, Oct. 6, 2016, at B1; see 
S.C. Exec. Ord. No. 2016-31 (Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.scstatehouse.gov/reports/ExecutiveOrders/exor2016-
31.pdf (ordering evacuations); S.C. Exec. Ord. No. 2016-32 (Oct. 6, 2016), http://dc.statelibrary.sc.gov/ 
bitstream/handle/10827/23228/GOV_Executive_Order_2016-32.pdf (ordering evacuation of parts of two 
additional counties); S.C. Exec. Ord. No. 2016-33 (Oct. 6, 2016), http://dc.statelibrary.sc.gov/bitstream/handle/ 
10827/23229/GOV_Executive_Order_2016-33.pdf (ordering further evacuations of parts of two other 
counties).  
 198 See Willie Drye, Hurricane Matthew: The Timeline, NAT’L GEO. (Oct. 13, 2016), http://voices. 
nationalgeographic.com/2016/10/13/hurricane-matthew-the-timeline/.  
 199 Pam Huff, Nearly 460,000 Tampa Bay Area Homes at Risk for Storm Surge, Report Says, TAMPA 
BAY BUS. J. (June 5, 2017, 7:46 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/tampabay/news/2017/06/05/nearly-460-
000-tampa-bay-area-homes-at-risk-for.html; Kimberly Miller, Did You Evacuate for Hurricane Matthew?, 
PALM BEACH POST, May 28, 2017, at S1; Camille Pendley, In Georgia, Assessing the Damage from Matthew, 
WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/2016/live-updates/weather/hurricane-matthew-churns-
up-florida-georgia-south-carolina-coast-as-a-category-3/in-georgia-assessing-the-damage-from-
matthew/?utm_term=.25999559262c (last updated Oct. 8, 2016, 10:44 AM).   
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Although Election Day was not until Tuesday, November 8, 2016, the 
deadline in these states for registering to vote in the 2016 general election was 
Tuesday, October 11.201 Democrats and various left-leaning groups brought a 
succession of suits to force these states to extend their voter registration 
deadlines as they struggled to recover from the hurricane and prepare for 
Election Day. A comparison of the manner in which the Florida and Georgia 
courts handled these claims is instructive.202  
1. Florida 
On Monday, October 10, the Florida Democratic Party, represented by 
Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s attorney, Marc E. Elias, 
obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) extending Florida’s voter 
registration deadline by one day, until 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, October 12.203  
That Wednesday, the court held a brief evidentiary hearing at which the 
State stopped defending the constitutionality of its statutory registration 
deadline and instead “took no position.”204 The plaintiffs presented evidence 
“that some soon-to-be citizens who planned to register in advance of the 
deadline had their naturalization ceremonies delayed due to Hurricane 
Matthew.”205 Based on such considerations, the court converted its TRO into a 
preliminary injunction, extending the voter registration deadline to 5:00 p.m. 
on Tuesday, October 18.206   
The court first held that the Florida Democratic Party had associational 
standing to challenge the registration deadline on behalf of its putative future 
members, even though the party was unable to identify a single person who 
 
 200 See Eileen Kelley, Gov. Scott Visits Jacksonville Beach on Tour of Storm Damage, FLA. TIMES-
UNION (Oct. 9, 2016, 10:41 AM), http://jacksonville.com/news/2016-10-09/gov-scott-visits-jacksonville-
beach-tour-storm-damage; see also Annie Martin, Volusia Residents, Businesses Clean Up; More Than 95,000 
Still Don’t Have Power, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Oct. 10, 2016), http://digitaledition.orlandosentinel.com/ 
tribune/article_popover.aspx?guid=48b531e8-4c78-4318-b44e-72e4e77b235f.  
 201 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.055(1)(a) (West 2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-224(a) (West 2017); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 7-5-150 (2017).  
 202 A North Carolina state court also extended the voter registration deadline in thirty-six counties, but 
rejected Democrats’ request to extend the deadline throughout the entire state. Russ Bynum & Gary D. 
Robertson, Judges Extend Voter-Registration in North Carolina, Georgia, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 15, 2016, 
https://apnews.com/289df7fb69bf43ed943b54e7447dfc99/judge-asked-extend-voter-registration-due-
hurricane.  
 203 Scott I, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1259 (N.D. Fla. 2016). 
 204 Fla. Democratic Party v. Scott (Scott II), No. 4:16-CV-626-MW/CAS, 2016 WL 6080225, at *1 
(N.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2016).  
 205 Id. at *1 n.2.  
 206 Id. at *1. 
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wished to register as a Democrat, but would be unable to do so as a result of 
Hurricane Matthew.207 The court noted that Hurricane Matthew’s “[l]ife-
threatening winds and rain forced many Floridians to evacuate or, at a 
minimum, hunker down in shelters or their homes” and led Governor Scott to 
close state offices in over thirty of Florida’s sixty-seven counties.208 It further 
stated that the “U.S. Postal Service also suspended operations in the affected 
areas,”209 though the closures were far more limited and brief than the court’s 
ruling may have suggested.210 The court estimated that the hurricane prevented 
“in excess of a hundred thousand aspiring eligible Florida voters” from 
registering to vote in the 2016 election.211 Following the court’s order, nearly 
64,000 additional registration forms were filed.212  
The district court misapplied the Constitution, misconstrued Florida law, 
and wholly overlooked important remedial issues. Starting with the court’s 
constitutional analysis, it held that “Florida’s statutory framework would 
categorically deny the right to vote” to unregistered people who could not 
register due to evacuation or office closures.213 The registration deadline was 
therefore subject to strict scrutiny, which it failed.214 The U.S. Supreme Court, 
however, has upheld the constitutionality of voter registration deadlines that 
 
 207 Scott I, 215 F. Supp. 3d at 1254 (“Plaintiff need not identify specific aspiring eligible voters who 
intend to register as Democrats and who will be barred from voting; it is sufficient that some inevitably will.”).  
 208 Id. at 1253, 1257 n.2.  
 209 Id. at 1257 n.2. 
 210 Many post offices in Florida closed early on Thursday, October 6. By Friday, October 7, a substantial 
number of post offices throughout the affected areas reopened and resumed ordinary mail operations. See, e.g., 
Press Release, U.S. Postal Serv., Postal Service Updates After Hurricane Matthew (Oct. 6, 2016), 
http://about.usps.com/news/state-releases/fl/2016/fl_2016_1007.htm (“The U.S. Postal Service will deliver 
mail in Broward, Miami-Dade, Monroe, and Palm Beach counties today, Friday, Oct. 7.”); Press Release, U.S. 
Postal Serv., Postal Service Resumes Delivery and Opens Many Post Offices in ZIP Code 338 As Hurricane 
Matthew Passes (Oct. 7, 2016), http://about.usps.com/news/state-releases/fl/2016/fl_2016_1007a.htm (noting 
that many Suncoast District post offices resumed service on Friday, October 7). Many remaining post offices 
reopened on Saturday, October 8. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Postal Serv., Postal Service Resumes Delivery 
in Hurricane-Affected Areas Today (Oct. 8, 2016), http://about.usps.com/news/state-releases/fl/2016/fl_2016_ 
1008.htm (“Today the Postal Service has resumed mail delivery in [multiple] hurricane-impacted areas . . . .”); 
Press Release, U.S. Postal Serv., Postal Service Suspends Additional Delivery, Retail Operations As Hurricane 
Matthew Nears (Oct. 6, 2012), http://about.usps.com/news/state-releases/fl/2016/fl_2016_1006c.htm (“All 
Post Offices in the Suncoast District are scheduled to resume normal business hours on Saturday, October 8 
and mail delivery will resume.”). Virtually all resumed ordinary operations by Tuesday, October 11. See, e.g., 
Press Release, U.S. Postal Serv., Post Office Operations Restored in North Florida and Southern Georgia (Oct. 
12, 2016), http://about.usps.com/news/state-releases/fl/2016/fl-ga_2016_1012.htm (stating that only one post 
office in northern Florida remained closed).  
 211 Scott I, 215 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 n.2.  
 212 Steve Bousquet, Voter Signups Surge to Record, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 20, 2016), 
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/tampabay/doc/1830360847.html?FMT=FT&pf=1.  
 213 Scott I, 215 F. Supp. 3d at 1257. 
 214 Id. 
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fell as many as fifty days before an election.215 Judged by those standards, 
enforcing Florida’s twenty-nine-day voter registration deadline would have 
been constitutional even if, as the court assumed, people displaced by 
Hurricane Matthew were prevented from registering to vote for a few extra 
days before that deadline (which, as discussed below, was not actually the 
case).216  
The district court also erred in concluding that strict scrutiny should apply 
on the grounds that Florida’s voter registration deadline would preclude some 
people from voting. The fact that a person must satisfy certain election-related 
requirements or follow particular procedures in order to vote is neither 
sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny nor constitutes “disenfranchise[ment].”217 To 
the contrary, that is how many generally accepted election rules work,218 from 
the requirement that a person present herself at a polling location before the 
polls close,219 to restrictions on the polling location at which a person must cast 
her ballot.220 Indeed, whenever someone does not register by the applicable 
deadline, she is prohibited from voting in the following election. Such 
deadlines do not trigger strict scrutiny, however, but rather have been 
 
 215 See Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681 (1973) (per curiam) (“[T]he 50-day voter registration cutoff 
(for election of state and local officials) is necessary to permit preparation of accurate voter lists.”); Burns v. 
Fortson, 410 U.S. 686, 686–87 (1973) (per curiam) (upholding constitutionality of law requiring people to 
register to vote at least fifty days before an election, though it “approaches the outer constitutional limits in this 
area”); see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 348 (1972) (“[Thirty] days appears to be an ample period of 
time for the State to complete whatever administrative tasks are necessary to prevent fraud—and a year, or 
three months, too much.”); cf. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 760–62 (1973) (upholding law requiring a 
person to register with a political party up to eleven months before a primary election to be eligible to vote in 
that primary).  
 216 As a matter of federal law, however, there must be a method of registering to vote for President up to 
thirty days before a presidential election. 52 U.S.C. § 10502(d) (2012) (“[E]ach State shall provide by law for 
the registration . . . of all duly qualified residents of such State who apply, not later than thirty days 
immediately prior to any presidential election, for registration or qualification to vote for . . . President and 
Vice President in such election . . . .”).  
 217 Cf. Scott I, 215 F. Supp. 3d at 1257.  
 218 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (holding that a state’s “important regulatory 
interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions,” even though election 
laws “govern[ing] the registration . . . of voters . . . inevitably affect[]—at least to some degree—the 
individual’s right to vote”); see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (“[T]o subject every voting 
regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling 
state interest . . . would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and 
efficiently.”).  
 219 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 100.011(1) (West 2015) (“The polls . . . shall be kept open until 7:00 p.m., of the 
same day . . . . Any elector who is in line at the time of the official closing of the polls shall be allowed to cast 
a vote in the election.”).  
 220 Id. § 101.045(1) (“A person is not permitted to vote in any election precinct or district other than the 
one in which the person has his or her legal residence and in which the person is registered.”). 
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repeatedly upheld by the Supreme Court.221 Thus, the court’s explanation for 
applying strict scrutiny was insufficient and unpersuasive.  
The most pervasive, fundamental flaw in the court’s analysis, however, is 
that it misunderstood how Florida’s voter registration law works. A major 
assumption of the court’s ruling was that people were being deprived of the 
chance to register for the election because numerous county election offices 
were closed due to the hurricane.222 Such closures, though, would only 
inconvenience people seeking to register in person, who constitute a small 
fraction of registrants.223 Voters remained free to submit registration forms by 
mail,224 regardless of whether county Supervisor of Elections offices were 
open. The effective date of an application submitted by mail is its postmark 
date.225 In the event the postmark is unclear, the application is deemed timely if 
the Supervisor’s office receives it “within 5 days” of the voter registration 
deadline.226   
Many post offices had resumed operations as early as Friday, October 7.227 
Virtually all were fully operational by the registration deadline of Tuesday 
October 11.228 Any applications that had been mailed either during the 
preceding days or on October 11 itself would be timely postmarked. 
Consequently, the fact that voter registration offices were closed in the days 
before the registration deadline had only a limited impact on people’s ability to 
register, and was far from the complete prohibition on registration the court 
found it to be.  
A potentially more promising basis for the court’s ruling would have been 
the storm’s impact on voters, rather than on election officials. The problem 
 
 221 See supra notes 215; see also supra note 218.  
 222 Scott I, 215 F. Supp. 3d at 1257 & n.2 (finding that, by “direct[ing] the state offices of more than 
thirty of Florida’s sixty-seven counties to close” due to Hurricane Matthew, Governor Scott “foreclosed the 
only methods of registering to vote: in person or by mail”).  
 223 In 2012, only 18% of Florida voters registered by completing a form in person at the Department of 
Elections. See DIV. OF ELECTIONS, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE, VOTER REGISTRATION YEARLY REPORT, JANUARY 
2012 THROUGH DECEMBER 2012, at 6 (2013), http://dos.myflorida.com/media/694075/voter-registration-
report-archive-2012.zip (file YTDTotal.PDF, located in folder 2012/December). The closure of a Supervisor 
of Election’s office in the days before the registration deadline would also prevent a person from mailing or 
calling the office to request that a blank voter registration form be mailed to them, but it seems unlikely that 
many voters obtain registration forms in that manner, or that putative applicants would have relied on that 
method so soon before the registration deadline.  
 224 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.053(4) (West 2017).  
 225 Id.  
 226 Id.  
 227 See supra note 210. 
 228 Id.  
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with that alternate approach, however, is that voters had approximately four 
years—since the 2012 presidential election—to register to vote in the 2016 
presidential election. The Constitution forbids a state from unreasonably 
burdening the right to vote.229 If a person chooses to wait until the last few 
days before the deadline to complete and submit a registration form, however, 
she runs the risk that an unexpected tragedy, medical emergency, accident, or 
other obstacle will hinder her filing. To determine the constitutionality of 
Florida’s voter registration deadline, the substantial obstacles Hurricane 
Matthew created during the last few days of the registration period cannot be 
considered in isolation, as the court viewed them, but rather must be assessed 
in the context of the entire 1,300-plus day registration period. The State of 
Florida did nothing to substantially burden the voting rights of people 
displaced by the hurricane; so long as Florida citizens submitted their 
registration forms at any point before the statutory deadline, they would have 
been registered to vote in the 2016 election. The state is not under a 
constitutional obligation to expand opportunities to register for people who do 
not become interested in an election until the last minute.  
In its ruling granting the preliminary injunction, the court pointed out that 
some people could not have registered earlier.230 Its only example, however, 
was that “some soon-to-be citizens who planned to register in advance of the 
deadline had their naturalization ceremonies delayed due to Hurricane 
Matthew.”231 Without emergency relief, “through no fault of their own,” those 
putative future citizens “would not have . . . the opportunity to vote in the 2016 
election.”232  
As an initial matter, the court’s analysis is faulty. It is highly unlikely that 
Florida’s voter registration deadline can be rendered unconstitutional by the 
federal government’s decision to reschedule naturalization ceremonies. The 
putative future citizens awaiting naturalization did not have a constitutional 
right to be naturalized on any particular day; indeed, they did not even have a 
right to demand their naturalizations occur prior to the 2016 presidential 
election. Had the federal government rescheduled the naturalization 
ceremonies for any other reason, the putative future citizens would not have 
been able to demand an exemption from Florida’s voter registration deadline. 
Thus, the sole example upon which the district court relied is inapposite.  
 
 229 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).  
 230 Scott II, No. 4:16-CV-626-MW/CAS, 2016 WL 6080225, at *1 n.2 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2016). 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id.  
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Even if the court’s analysis were correct, however, yet another substantial 
problem remains: the disparity between the scope of its holding and the 
remedy it ordered. Although the court held that the voter registration deadline 
was unconstitutional as applied to “those who may have been affected by 
Hurricane Matthew’s destruction,”233 it issued a Defendant-Oriented 
Injunction234 completely suspending the deadline across the state, for everyone, 
as if it were facially unconstitutional. The court explained, “It would be grossly 
inappropriate . . . to hold that aspiring eligible voters in Jacksonville could 
register later than those in Pensacola.”235  
The court’s reasoning conflated facial and as-applied challenges to 
Florida’s voter registration deadline.236 Its order was not limited to people who 
were displaced by Hurricane Matthew or the counties substantially affected by 
the hurricane. Nor did the court require people seeking to register after the 
deadline to submit an affidavit affirming that they had been displaced by 
Hurricane Matthew, lost power, had their mail service discontinued, or faced 
some other substantial burden in registering on time.237 By extending the 
deadline for the entire state, the court suspended application of state law to 
millions of people to whom, even under the court’s reasoning, it could have 
been constitutionally applied, including people not displaced by the hurricane 
who could have mailed a voter registration form without facing an 
unconstitutionally severe burden.  
The court also failed to recognize the extremely difficult jurisdictional, 
rule-based, prudential, and other problems that arise from issuing a Defendant-
Oriented Injunction in a non-class case.238  The court held that the plaintiff 
Democratic Party had standing to enforce the rights of individuals wishing to 
register as Democrats;239 by extension, it lacked standing to enforce the rights 
of individuals who did not wish to join that party. The court’s order prohibiting 
the state from applying its statutory deadline to anyone raised serious Article 
 
 233 Id. at *1. 
 234 Michael T. Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting 
Rights, Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 500 (2016) (“A 
Defendant-Oriented Injunction . . . allows a single judge of ostensibly limited territorial jurisdiction to 
completely prohibit the defendant agency or official from enforcing the challenged provision against anyone 
throughout the state or nation. Defendant-Oriented Injunctions turn non-class, individual-plaintiff cases into 
modern analogues to ‘spurious’ class actions.”).  
 235 Scott I, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1258 (N.D. Fla. 2016).  
 236 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.055(1)(a) (West 2017). 
 237 See Scott II, 2016 WL 6080225, at *1 (extending the voter registration deadline for all Floridians, 
without limitation). 
 238 Morley, supra note 234, at 494.  
 239 Scott I, 215 F. Supp. 3d at 1250, 1254.  
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III and Due Process issues by enforcing the rights of third-party non-litigants 
not before the court, whose rights the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert. Of 
course, a narrower order—allowing only putative Democrats to register after 
the deadline—would have appeared even more politically motivated240 and 
potentially raised First Amendment or Equal Protection concerns.241 The 
order’s scope raises questions about whether indispensable parties were 
missing242 or whether the case should have been required to proceed as a Rule 
23(b)(2) class action.243  
Of course, the court cannot be faulted for failing to recognize or work 
through all of these difficult remedial issues in the rushed context of an 
emergency proceeding. Yet they are precisely the types of problems that recur 
in emergency election litigation.244 It is critical to determine the proper 
remedial approach in advance of such disputes, when the pertinent issues can 
be fully ventilated, to ensure judges faced with statewide (and potentially even 
nationwide) TRO requests neither overlook nor minimize them.  
The court went on to hold in the alternative that, even if Florida’s voter 
registration deadline were not subject to strict scrutiny, the state’s “statutory 
framework” for voter registration failed both the ad hoc Anderson-Burdick 
balancing test245 and rational basis scrutiny.246 These alternate holdings cannot 
withstand serious analysis. The court emphasized that, because other states 
allow same-day voter registration on Election Day, “[t]here is no reason 
 
 240 Cf. infra note 385 (discussing the court’s unusual partisan rhetoric).  
 241 But see Morley, supra note 234, at 548–49.  
 242 See FED. R. CIV. P. 19.  
 243 See Morley, supra note 234, at 549–56 (arguing that a court should require a public-law case to 
proceed as a Rule 23(b)(2) class action when, if the plaintiffs succeed on the merits, the court would be 
required to grant relief to all right holders, rather than just the plaintiffs before it).  
 244 I have addressed these issues for both class actions, Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 
23(b)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615 (2017), and non-class cases, 
Morley, supra note 234. In a forthcoming piece, I will present a more comprehensive proposal for reform.  
 245 The Anderson-Burdick balancing test, derived from the Supreme Court’s rulings in Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983), and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992), requires a court, on a 
largely ad hoc basis, to subjectively weigh the burden an election-related requirement imposes upon the 
plaintiffs’ right to vote against the state’s interest in enforcing that requirement. See Michael T. Morley, 
Remedial Equilibration and the Right to Vote Under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2015 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 279 (2015) (arguing that the Anderson-Burdick test is unnecessarily subjective and suggesting it be 
replaced by a more objective standard rooted in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Court has 
recognized that most election laws will survive Anderson-Burdick balancing. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788; 
accord Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.  
 246 Scott I, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1257 (N.D. Fla. 2016) (“Even assuming that Florida’s statutory 
framework was subject to a more flexible Anderson-Burdick test, it still would be 
unconstitutional. . . . Florida’s statutory framework is unconstitutional even if rational basis review applied 
(which it does not).”).  
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Florida could not do the same.”247 Indeed, the court found the refusal of 
Florida—like thirty-four other states248—to allow people to register on 
Election Day itself “incomprehensible.”249 Accordingly, the court concluded 
that Florida’s voter registration deadline was unconstitutional, even without 
regard to the hurricane. Neither the Anderson-Burdick test nor the rational 
basis test requires states to adopt the most permissive possible procedures for 
voter registration, however. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly held that 
states’ voter registration requirements are not unconstitutional simply because 
other states have adopted more liberal alternatives.250  
The district court also unilaterally declared, without any supporting 
evidence, that the burden of extending the voter registration deadline would be 
“de minimis,” and that it was “irrational” for the state to refuse to do so.251 The 
court’s eagerness to gratuitously declare that the deadline could not survive 
even rational basis scrutiny—which the court expressly held was not the 
correct standard252—calls into question its objectivity.253 Virtually nothing fails 
under the extraordinarily permissive rational basis standard.254  
The state had—at a minimum—a legitimate interest in focusing its 
resources on recovering from the hurricane, processing and confirming the 
accuracy of timely submitted voter registration forms, assessing the availability 
of polling locations following the hurricane, conducting early voting (which 
commences ten days before federal elections),255 and preparing for a smooth 
Election Day. It was reasonable for the state to seek to protect election officials 
from having to handle tens of thousands of additional, late-submitted voter 
registration forms while simultaneously recovering from Hurricane Matthew 
and preparing for early voting and Election Day. The Supreme Court itself has 
 
 247 Id. at 1257–58 (reiterating that “fifteen other states, including, for example, Iowa, even allow 
registration on Election Day”).  
 248 See id. at 1258.  
 249 Id.  
 250 See Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S 679, 681 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that, even though other states 
required voters to register only thirty days before an election, an Arizona law requiring registration fifty days 
before a primary was constitutional).  
 251 Scott I, 215 F. Supp. 3d at 1257.  
 252 Id.  
 253 See also infra note 385 (discussing the court’s partisan commentary).  
 254 See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court, 86 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1971) (characterizing the rational basis test as “minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in 
fact”); see also Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 136 n.8 
(2011) (“Rational basis review is deemed so minimal that academics and other observers of the Court often 
maintain that when a law is struck down under a purported rational basis test, the Court is not actually 
applying ‘true rational basis’ review but rather is employing ‘rational basis with a bite.’”).  
 255 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.657(1)(d) (West 2015).  
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recognized that enforcing voter registration deadlines promotes a state’s 
important interests in “prepar[ing] adequate voter records and protect[ing] its 
electoral processes from possible fraud.”256 These interests only grow in 
magnitude as an election draws closer.  
Moreover, allowing late registrations after the deadline passed would 
deprive third parties, including candidates, from reviewing new voter 
registrations to identify fraudulent ones. Particularly when third-party groups 
such as the former ACORN and its affiliates,257 as well as their counterparts on 
the right,258 engage in voter registration efforts shortly before the deadline, 
there is a high risk that substantial numbers of registrations will be erroneous 
or fraudulent, requiring even closer scrutiny from election officials.259   
In concluding that Florida’s voter registration deadline failed Anderson-
Burdick balancing and was irrational, the court also failed to address the fact 
that, only eight years earlier, a sister court in the Southern District of Florida 
upheld the deadline’s constitutionality.260 The Southern District held that 
Florida “provides ample opportunities for all of its citizens to submit 
completed voter registration forms in a timely fashion.”261 It explained: 
The year-round nature of voter registration, the liberal availability 
of voter registration applications, the assistance that election 
officials offer to applicants and third-party groups, the numerous 
means of submitting completed applications, and the requirement 
of prompt notice to applicants who submit incomplete 
applications refute any suggestion that the registration deadline 
practically burdens the ability of Floridians to register to vote. 
Florida law provides every opportunity for applicants to effect 
 
 256 Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S 679, 680 (1973) (per curiam); see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 
348 (1972) (recognizing that election officials reasonably could require at least thirty days to “complete 
whatever administrative tasks are necessary to prevent fraud” with regard to new voter registrations).  
 257 See supra notes 102–03.   
 258 See Joseph Tanfani et al., RNC Dumps Vote Consultant; Florida Investigating Allegations of Fraud 
by Company Hired to Register Voters, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 28, 2012, at A3 (explaining that a consulting 
firm hired by the RNC was under investigation for allegedly submitting fraudulent voter registration forms); 
see also Joseph Tanfani, In Voter Registration Drives, Some See License for Fraud; Abuses at Sign-Up Events 
Eclipse Deception at Polls, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 2, 2012, at A10 (“Almost every election season, these 
[voter registration] campaigns—which typically pay workers to collect registrations—lead to charges of 
trickery and fraud: forged signatures, made-up names, voters who say they were duped into registering with 
the wrong party.”).  
 259 See Diaz v. Cobb, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1326–27 (S.D. Fla. 2008); see also Dara Kam, Groups’ 
Voter Sign-Up Drives Raise Fears About Fraudulent Applications, PALM BEACH POST, Sept. 28, 2008, at 6A. 
 260 Diaz, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1319.  
 261 Id. at 1333–34.  
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their registrations long before books close twenty-nine days before 
an election.262 
While Hurricane Matthew imposed unexpected substantial burdens on voters 
in the days immediately preceding the 2016 voter registration deadline, nearly 
all of the Southern District’s observations remained applicable.  
The Southern District went on to declare that enforcing the deadline served 
a public interest that was not merely “important,” but “compelling.”263 The 
deadline “provides a certainty and reliability that enable election officials to 
direct their efforts to the essential tasks of election preparation and thus 
minimizes the degree of disorder and the risk of error and even chaos.”264  The 
court recognized that, “between the registration deadline and election day, 
local election officials operate under immense pressure to complete the 
multitude of critical tasks imposed on them by law and by practice.”265 It 
identified and discussed ten discrete sets of responsibilities election officials 
must fulfill, primarily within that short period.266 As a result, election officials 
face “enormous pressure” and “stress” that should not be unnecessarily 
exacerbated.267 Enforcing the deadline “decreases the confusion and 
distraction . . . and thereby reduces the risk of error and disorder in Florida’s 
election process.”268 All of the compelling interests the court identified are 
only magnified following the dislocation, delay, and last-minute adjustments to 
polling places and election personnel that a hurricane entails.  
Thus, in the Hurricane Matthew litigation, the Northern District erred in 
applying strict scrutiny and concluding that enforcement of Florida’s deadline 
could not survive rational basis scrutiny. Though it is a more subjective call, 
the court’s Anderson-Burdick analysis was one-sided and likely incorrect, as 
well, minimizing or ignoring most of the considerations the Southern District 
found persuasive. The Constitution did not require extension of the voter 
registration deadline due to Hurricane Matthew.  
  
 
 262 Id. at 1334–35 (emphasis added).  
 263 Id. at 1335.  
 264 Id.  
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. at 1336–39.  
 267 Id. at 1340.  
 268 Id.  
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2. Georgia 
The Georgia NAACP and several other left-wing groups filed multiple 
federal lawsuits in Georgia, seeking to extend that state’s voter registration 
deadline of Tuesday, October 11, as well.269 The first case, filed on October 12 
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, sought to extend 
the deadline only for Chatham County.270 As the court explained: 
[T]he Chatham County Board of Elections office was closed from 
October 6 to October 12, 2016. Moreover, post office closures 
and the suspension of mail service during this period also 
potentially prevented individuals from submitting their 
registration applications. Finally, many individuals were 
potentially unable to register, either in person or electronically, 
due to evacuation or recovery efforts.271 
The plaintiffs asked the court to extend the voter registration deadline to 
October 18 in Chatham County.272 The state objected, arguing that extending 
the deadline would significantly burden election officials, particularly since 
early voting was scheduled to begin on October 17.273 The court expressed 
“significant reservations” about the plaintiffs’ claims and recognized that the 
state “may not be under any obligation” to extend the deadline.274 It opined 
that granting an extension was nevertheless “the right thing to do.”275 The 
undeniable “administrative difficulty” of extending the deadline, the court 
explained, “pale[s] in comparison to the physical, emotional, and financial 
strain Chatham County residents faced in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Matthew.”276 It added, “Extending a small degree of common courtesy by 
allowing impacted individuals a few extra days to register to vote seems like a 
rather small consolation.”277  
 
 269 The Democratic Party did not directly devote any resources to this case. Georgia was not considered 
a “swing state” in the 2016 presidential election. See Charles Mahtesian, What Are the Swing States in 2016?, 
POLITICO (June 15, 2016, 5:37 AM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/swing-states-2016-election/2016/06/what-
are-the-swing-states-in-2016-list-224327.  
 270 Ga. Coalition for the Peoples’ Agenda, Inc. v. Deal, 214 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1344–45 (S.D. Ga. 2016).  
 271 Id. at 1345. 
 272 Id.  
 273 Id.  
 274 Id.  
 275 Id. at 1345.  
 276 Id.  
 277 Id. at 1345–46. 
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On October 14, the court granted a preliminary injunction extending the 
voter registration deadline in Chatham County to October 18.278 It limited its 
relief to that county, however, and refused to extend its order statewide.279 On 
October 18, the NAACP filed another TRO request before the same judge, this 
time seeking to extend the voter registration deadline to October 25 for the 
entire state.280 The court noted that, while the Chatham County Board of 
Elections had been closed for the week before the deadline and did not reopen 
until the deadline had passed, other counties’ boards of elections had closed for 
only two or three days and reopened prior to the deadline.281 It further declared 
that the State of Georgia had not burdened anyone’s right to vote.282 Neither 
Hurricane Matthew, nor the resulting power failures and home damage, were 
“impediments created by the State of Georgia that require it to provide an 
extension to the voter registration deadline.”283  
Setting aside its state action concerns, the court went on to apply the 
Anderson–Burdick balancing test.284 It concluded that enforcing the voter 
registration deadline on people outside of Chatham County imposed only a 
limited burden on their rights, because other counties’ voter registration offices 
had reopened before it passed.285 The state, in contrast, had a substantial 
interest in allowing the election to proceed without reopening voter 
registration.286 Early voting had already commenced; forcing the state to 
register new voters while voting was occurring would cause substantial 
“administrative and technological difficulties.”287 Thus, enforcing the voter 
registration deadline throughout the state would not violate people’s right to 
vote.288 The court denied the request for a statewide TRO,289 and the plaintiffs 
voluntarily dismissed the case.  
  
 
 278 Id. at 1344, 1346. 
 279 Id. at 1346 n.2.  
 280 Bethea v. Deal, No. CV-216-140, 2016 WL 6123241, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 19, 2016).  
 281 Id.  
 282 Id. at *3. 
 283 Id. at *2.  
 284 Id.; see supra note 245.  
 285 Bethea, 2016 WL 6123241, at *2.  
 286 Id. at *3. 
 287 Id.  
 288 Id.  
 289 Id. at *4.  
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3. A Tale of Two States 
The differences between the Florida and Georgia rulings arising from 
Hurricane Matthew raise two key questions common to all election 
emergencies. First, at what point is a disruption sufficiently severe to warrant 
suspending voting laws, requirements, or procedures? Second, how broadly 
should any such suspension apply? The Florida court unilaterally extended the 
voter registration deadline for all voters throughout the state.290 The Georgia 
court, in contrast, extended the registration deadline exclusively for Chatham 
County, the only county whose board of elections remained closed past the 
deadline as a result of Hurricane Matthew.291   
In one sense, the Florida court’s ruling was fairer because it ensured that 
voter registration would not be extended only within geographic areas 
favorable to one political party, or only for people seeking to join a particular 
party. On the other hand, it was impermissibly overbroad because it enjoined 
enforcement of state law, even under circumstances in which it could have 
been constitutionally applied. The Georgia court’s approach, in contrast, was 
likely procedurally proper, yet opened the door to political manipulation. 
Partisan or ideological groups could bring limited lawsuits seeking relief only 
for geographic areas whose residents are likely to vote for their preferred 
candidates, leaving the rights of others throughout the state unenforced.  
The litigation process is generally better suited for resolving traditional 
disputes292 than recrafting the complex, bureaucratic, fundamentally 
adversarial electoral process. Moreover, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Constitution as requiring courts to apply vague, ad hoc, unavoidably subjective 
standards in deciding whether voting-related restrictions are permissible.293 In 
light of these concerns, courts should not be forced to constitutionalize 
election-related emergencies by adjudicating their consequences, particularly 
in the context of rushed TRO and preliminary injunction hearings. Rather, 
states should pass election-specific emergency laws that empower election 
 
 290 Scott I, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1258 (N.D. Fla. 2016).  
 291 Bethea, 2016 WL 6123241, at *3. 
 292 See Lon L. Fuller, The Form and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978) (contrasting 
the types of disputes the adjudicative process is structured to resolve with “polycentric” disputes that courts are 
ill-equipped to handle); cf. Owen Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1978) (arguing that courts 
are well-suited to adjudicate cases involving public values, rather than solely traditional disputes between 
parties). 
 293 See supra note 245.  
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officials to address terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other calamities 
based on objective, specific provisions.294  
II. ELECTION EMERGENCIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
When emergencies occur shortly before or during an election, candidates or 
political parties often seek TROs or preliminary injunctions to compel election 
officials to modify the applicable rules and procedures. Such litigation is 
especially likely when states lack emergency laws that specifically empower 
election officials to adjust to unexpected exigencies.  
This Part begins by exploring courts’ power to delay or reschedule 
elections, including federal races. It then examines the circumstances under 
which election emergencies warrant constitutional relief. This Part goes on to 
consider the proper timing of constitutional challenges based on election 
emergencies and the appropriate geographic scope of relief. After explaining 
why courts should be especially cautious in adjudicating such cases, this Part 
concludes by discussing the special case of polling place hour extensions.  
A. Judicial Power to Delay or Reschedule Elections 
Courts may postpone elections or order re-votes, despite laws governing 
elections’ timing, when necessary to prevent or correct constitutional 
violations stemming from election emergencies.295 For example, federal law 
provides that elections for the U.S. House of Representatives must be held on 
the “Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in November, in every even numbered 
year.”296 The Supreme Court has held this law requires that “the final act of 
selection” for congressional candidates be made on Election Day.297 Under 2 
U.S.C. § 8, however, “the laws of the several States” may require House 
elections be held on a different day when a vacancy exists due to “a failure to 
 
 294 See infra Part III.  
 295 See, e.g., Mulroy, supra note 8 (arguing that the Florida Circuit Court for Palm Beach County had 
power to order a re-vote in the 2000 presidential election because the “butterfly ballot” was unconstitutionally 
confusing).  
 296 2 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). Despite this statute, courts have approved both early voting, Millsaps v. 
Thompson, 259 F.3d 535, 549 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming validity of early voting laws because a “final 
selection of federal officeholders” is not made until Election Day); Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Bomer, 199 
F.3d 773, 777 (5th Cir. 2000) (same), and state laws requiring federal elections to be conducted entirely by 
mail, Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Keisling, 259 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Although voting takes 
place, perhaps most voting, prior to election day” under Oregon’s vote-by-mail system, “the election is not 
‘consummated’ before election day because voting still takes place on that day.”).  
 297 Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 72 (1997).  
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elect [a Representative] at the time prescribed by law.”298 Thus, state election 
emergency statutes may authorize state officials to change the date of a House 
election due to exigent circumstances.299 Moreover, if a state or federal court 
concludes that an election emergency will cause (or has caused) violations of 
the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute, its remedial powers would supersede 
the federal statute adopting a uniform Election Day.300  
Federal law also requires that U.S. Senate elections be held, as necessary, 
at the same time as House elections.301 The plain text of 2 U.S.C. § 8 is limited 
solely to House elections, however,302 and no other federal law authorizes 
Senate elections to be held on a different day if a senator is not elected on 
Election Day. The courts that have considered the issue have nevertheless held 
that § 8 applies equally to Senate elections.303 The only reason the statute does 
not mention rescheduling Senate elections is that it was enacted prior to the 
Seventeenth Amendment’s ratification,304 when state legislatures still 
appointed senators.305 This argument has weakened over time, however, 
because Congress amended § 8 in 2005 to address major disasters that kill 
more than 100 members of the House of Representatives, yet did not take the 
opportunity to include senators.306 Nevertheless, since federal courts have 
 
 298 2 U.S.C. § 8(a) (2012).  
 299 See Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 526 (D.D.C. 1982) (three-judge court) (“Congress did not 
expressly anticipate that a natural disaster might necessitate a postponement, yet no one would seriously 
contend that [federal law] would prevent a state from rescheduling its congressional elections under such 
circumstances.”); see also infra Section II.B.  
 300 See Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 525.  
 301 2 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“At the regular election held in any State next preceding the expiration of the 
term for which any Senator was elected . . . at which election a Representative to Congress is regularly by law 
to be chosen, a United States Senator from said state shall be elected   . . .”).  
 302 Id. § 8(a) (authorizing “elections in any State, District, or Territory for a Representative or Delegate 
to fill a vacancy”).  
 303 See Judge v. Quinn, 623 F. Supp. 2d 933, 935 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (rejecting the argument that an election 
to fill a Senate vacancy may be held only on Election Day because, although 2 U.S.C. § 8 “refers only to 
‘Representative[s]’ and ‘Delegate[s],’” it “has been construed to apply by implication to Senators as well”), 
aff’d on other grounds, 612 F.3d 537, 557 (declining to “comment on this argument”), amended and reh’g en 
banc den’d, 387 F. App’x 629 (7th Cir. 2010); Public Citizen, Inc. v. Miller, 813 F. Supp. 821, 829 n.8 (N.D. 
Ga. 1993) (“Because the election of Senators is governed by the same timing restriction as is the election of 
Representatives in 2 U.S.C. § 7, this Court is convinced that section 8 applies equally to Senators and 
Representatives.”), aff’d mem., 992 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 71 n.3 
(1997) (holding that, under 2 U.S.C. § 8, if no House or Senate candidate “receives a majority vote on federal 
election day, there has been a failure to elect and a subsequent run-off election is required”).  
 304 See Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. 11, § 4, 17 Stat. 28, 29 (1872); see also Miller, 813 F. Supp. at 829 n.8 
(“The United States Congress enacted 2 U.S.C. § 8 in 1872, 41 years before the ratification of the Seventeenth 
Amendment which provides for the popular election of United States Senators.”).  
 305 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.  
 306 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-55, § 301(2), 119 Stat. 565, 588–89 
(Aug. 2, 2005) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 8(b) (2012)).  
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routinely permitted Senate run-offs to be held after Election Day when 
required by state law,307 federal law would likely pose no obstacle to election 
officials or courts postponing Senate elections until after Election Day due to 
an election emergency. In any event, as with House races, the federal statutory 
requirement that Senate races to be held on Election Day would not prevent 
courts from rescheduling a Senate election or ordering a re-vote when 
necessary to prevent an election emergency from causing violations of federal 
constitutional or statutory rights.  
Presidential elections raise more difficulties. Federal law requires states to 
appoint presidential electors on Election Day in presidential election years.308 
When a state holds a presidential election but “fail[s] to make a choice” on 
Election Day, “the electors may be appointed on a subsequent day in such 
manner as the legislature of such State may direct.”309 Like 2 U.S.C. § 8, this 
provision authorizes states to delay elections due to emergencies. It may be 
objected that this provision allows electors only to be “appointed” rather than 
elected, “on a subsequent day.”310 But the Constitution consistently uses the 
word “appoint” to refer to the selection of electors,311 and no one questions the 
propriety of state legislatures choosing electors through elections.312  
The Constitution contains an additional provision, however, that applies 
solely to presidential races. It states, “Congress may determine the time of 
choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes; which 
day shall be the same throughout the United States.”313 At least one court has 
held that this provision requires that electors be chosen on the same day 
throughout the nation: Election Day.314 This reading is mistaken, however. 
While Article II states that electors throughout the nation must cast their votes 
on the same day, it does not expressly require that electors also be selected on 
 
 307 Foster, 522 U.S. at 71 (recognizing that 2 U.S.C. § 8 allows states to hold run-off elections when no 
candidate receives a majority on Election Day); Miller, 813 F. Supp. at 831 (holding that, when a state 
experiences a “legitimate failure to elect” a senator because no candidate obtained a majority on Election Day, 
2 U.S.C. § 8 permits a state to hold a subsequent run-off election due to “exigent circumstances”).  
 308 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).  
 309 Id. § 2.  
 310 Id.  
 311 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.  
 312 Mulroy, supra note 8, at 239; see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam). 
 313 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.  
 314 Fladell v. Elections Canvassing Comm’n of Fla., Nos. CL 00-10965 AB et al., 2000 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 
755, at *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 20, 2000) (“Because Presidential elections are the only national elections held in 
our country, our forefathers included clear and unambiguous language in the Constitution of the United States 
which require that Presidential ‘electors’ be elected on the same day throughout the United States.”), aff’d on 
other grounds sub nom. Fladell v. Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d 1240, 1242 (Fla. 2000).  
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a uniform day.315 This plain-meaning interpretation is consistent with historical 
practice; in the decades following the Constitution’s ratification, “presidential 
elections were held on different days in different [s]tates.”316 Thus, there are no 
impediments to a court postponing or ordering a re-vote in federal elections, 
including presidential races, in extreme cases when an electoral emergency 
requires it.  
B. Constitutional Challenges Based on Election Emergencies 
Federal constitutional challenges to impending or ongoing elections 
generally arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process or Equal 
Protection Clauses.317 State constitutions contain a range of other election-
related provisions that limit states’ discretion,318 but most involve legal 
standards substantially equivalent to the Fourteenth Amendment.319 In general, 
a person’s Fourteenth Amendment right to vote may be violated only by 
intentional government conduct320 such as the adoption of malapportioned 
redistricting schemes,321 enactment of statutes that restrict the franchise322 or 
impose undue burdens on the electoral process,323 or racial discrimination.324 
 
 315 Harris v. Fla. Elections Canvassing Comm’n, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1324 (N.D. Fla. 2000) (“[T]he 
Day that ‘shall be the same throughout the United States’ is the Day that the already-chosen Electors give their 
votes, not the ‘Time of chusing’ [sic] them. Thus, this clause, standing alone does not require that individual 
voters all choose the Electors on the same day.”); Lynne H. Rambo, The Lawyers’ Role in Selecting the 
President: The Complete Legal History of the 2000 Election, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 105, 127 n.131 (2002) 
(“Because the Framers chose to use the term ‘Time’ in the first clause, dealing with Election Day, and yet the 
term ‘Day’ in the second clause, dealing with the date of the electoral college, and then repeated the term 
‘Day’ in the third clause, one could conclude that the Constitution requires only that the date of the electoral 
college be uniform throughout the United States.”); see also Mulroy, supra note 8, at 230 (same). 
 316 Mulroy, supra note 8, at 230.  
 317 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 318 See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89, 101–05 
(2014).  
 319 Morley, supra note 22, at 190–91.  
 320 See, e.g., Welker v. Clarke, 239 F.3d 596, 597 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001) (exercising jurisdiction over 
plaintiff’s claim that election officials intentionally conspired to allow non-residents and people registered at 
fraudulent addresses to vote in order to benefit a particular candidate).  
 321 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that adoption of state legislative districts with 
substantially unequal populations violates the Equal Protection Clause).  
 322 Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (“[I]f a challenged state statute 
grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to 
others, the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state 
interest.”); Carrington v. Rush, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (“‘Fencing out’ from the franchise a sector of the 
population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”).  
 323 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144, 149 (1972) (invalidating substantial mandatory filing fee for 
candidates).  
 324 Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402–03 (1964) (invalidating statute requiring that ballots specify 
candidates’ races next to their names); see also Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 224–25 (1985).  
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Changing the rules governing an election after it has occurred also raises a 
serious threat of due process violations.325  
A state’s failure to accept or count people’s votes due to “garden variety 
election irregularities,” in contrast, generally does not raise constitutional 
issues.326 A voter’s due process and equal protection rights are not violated 
when state officials inadvertently or negligently violate state election 
statutes,327 miscount or disregard votes,328 allow ineligible people to vote,329 
misapply rules,330 or improperly count invalid absentee ballots,331 or where 
mechanical error, “human error,” or “[v]oting device malfunction[s]”332 
occur.333  
 
 325 Bennett v. Yoshino, 140 F.3d 1218, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a due process violation 
occurs where there has been “likely reliance by voters on an established election procedure and/or official 
pronouncements” and “significant disenfranchisement . . . results from a change in the election procedures”); 
Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574, 582 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that a state court’s new interpretation of its 
absentee voting law after votes were cast violated due process because, “had the candidates and citizens of 
Alabama known that something less than the signature of two witnesses or a notary . . . would suffice” to 
render an absentee ballot valid, “campaign strategies would have taken this into account” and some people 
“who did not vote would have voted absentee”); Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1078–79 (1st Cir. 1978) 
(holding that the Secretary of State’s refusal to count absentee ballots in a primary election after election 
officials had issued them and voters cast them violated due process); Briscoe v. Kusper, 435 F.2d 1046 (7th 
Cir. 1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause prohibited an election board from refusing to accept candidate 
petitions based on a newly announced interpretation of the rules).  
 326 Griffin, 570 F.2d at 1076; accord Bennett, 140 F.3d at 1226; Hutchinson v. Miller, 797 F.2d 1279, 
1283 (4th Cir. 1986); see also Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 1975) (“It is not every election 
irregularity . . . which will give rise to a constitutional claim . . . .”).  
 327 Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7, 11 (1944) (holding that the State Primary Canvassing Board did 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment by excluding a candidate who had placed second in the Republican 
primary from the general election ballot, even though the Republican party was entitled to nominate two 
candidates); see also Hennings, 523 F.2d at 864 (refusing to recognize due process claim where election 
officials improperly failed to distribute paper ballots after voting machines malfunctioned).  
 328 Bodine v. Elkhart Cty. Election Bd., 788 F.2d 1270, 1271, 1273 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that no 
constitutional violation occurred when election officials used an untested vote tabulation system that 
repeatedly generated errors in violation of state law); Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449, 451, 454 (5th Cir. 
1980) (holding that no constitutional violation occurred where erroneously configured voting machines caused 
a dispositive number of votes for a candidate to be disregarded).  
 329 Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 1970) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to primary 
election results where election officials improperly allowed non-party members to vote in a closed party 
primary).  
 330 Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302, 1307–08, 1317 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the plaintiff’s due 
process rights were not violated when a state party committee rejected 14,000 votes cast in violation of a party 
anti-crossover rule, and reduced candidates’ vote tallies based on public opinion polls and speculation as to the 
candidates for whom those ballots had been cast).  
 331 Pettengill v. Putnam Cty. R-1 Sch. Dist., 472 F.2d 121, 122 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that no 
constitutional violation arose from election officials’ decision to count absentee ballots that were “void” due to 
“irregularities in [their] application, delivery or execution”).  
 332 Shannon v. Jacobowitz, 394 F.3d 90, 91–92, 97 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the plaintiffs had not 
stated a due process claim when a voting machine failed to record between sixty-nine and 139 votes for a 
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An election violates the Due Process Clause only in the “exceptional 
case”334 where it is “fundamental[ly] unfair.”335 A refusal to hold a statutorily 
or constitutionally required election, for example, “would work a total and 
complete disenfranchisement of the electorate, and therefore would constitute a 
violation of due process.”336 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit found that the 
plaintiffs had stated a due process claim arising from Ohio’s 2006 
congressional elections in alleging:  
[R]egistered voters were denied the right to vote because their 
names were missing from the rolls. Inadequate provision of 
voting machines caused 10,000 Columbus voters not to vote. Poll 
workers improperly refused assistance to disabled voters. 
Provisional ballots were not distributed to appropriate voters, 
causing voters to be denied the right to vote.337  
The court concluded that these allegations “could support a troubling picture of 
a system so devoid of standards and procedures as to violate substantive due 
process.”338  
Under these standards, election emergencies that have a reasonable 
likelihood of substantially disrupting an impending or ongoing election and 
denying a significant proportion of the electorate an opportunity to vote would 
violate due process.339 To rise to the extreme level of a due process violation, 
an election emergency must make voting or the conduct of the election 
unreasonably dangerous or impracticable, rather than merely inconvenient or 
time-consuming.340 Moreover, the emergency must completely preclude voting 
by a substantial fraction of the electorate, rather than causing only isolated, 
 
candidate who lost by twenty-five votes because government officials had not engaged in intentional 
misconduct). 
 333 Hennings, 523 F.2d at 864 (holding that plaintiffs had not stated a constitutional claim when their 
votes were not recorded due to voting machine malfunctions).  
 334 League of Women Voters v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 478 (6th Cir. 2008).  
 335 Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1077 (1st Cir. 1971); accord Gold v. Feinberg, 101 F.3d 796, 801 
(2d Cir. 1996).  
 336 Bonas v. Town of N. Smithfield, 265 F.3d 69, 75 (1st Cir. 2001); see also Duncan v. Polythress, 657 
F.2d 691, 703 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that “the denial of a legally-required election obviously” violates 
constitutional rights).  
 337 Brunner, 548 F.3d at 478.  
 338 Id.; see also Ury v. Santee, 303 F. Supp. 119, 126 (N.D. Ill. 1969).  
 339 See In re Gen. Election, 531 A.2d 836, 839 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).  
 340 See, e.g., State v. Marcotte, 89 A.2d 308, 312 (Me. 1952) (“There was a storm of such unusual 
proportions and such unexpected violence that it might well be considered that there was no election due to an 
‘act of God.’”).  
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discrete problems.341 Ordinary obstacles such as heavy rain or snow are 
insufficient to empower a court to delay or cancel an election: 
Elections must of necessity be held in all kinds of weather. If an 
election is held in fact, it is valid, though there may have been 
interference as there was here by the elements. The vote may be 
reduced thereby or the outcome changed, but qualified voters who 
fail to go to the polls to vote under the circumstances will be 
bound by the expressed will of those who do.342 
When voters have an extended period of time to engage in an activity, such 
as registering to vote or engaging in early voting, the Constitution generally 
does not entitle them to deadline extensions due to election emergencies. 
Election laws, restrictions, and procedures generally do not violate Due 
Process or Equal Protection restrictions unless they are unduly burdensome 
under the Anderson-Burdick standard.343 In determining the burden imposed by 
a voting-related requirement, among the most important considerations are the 
amount of time a person had to comply with it and alternative ways of 
satisfying it.344  
For example, people may register to vote for an impending election at any 
time between the voter registration cutoff for the previous election and the 
voter registration deadline for that upcoming race. Depending on the event 
chosen as the starting point,345 this period often will typically be months or 
even years long. Requiring a person to submit a voter registration form at some 
point over the course of several months or years is not an undue burden, even 
if circumstances unexpectedly wind up making it more difficult to register at 
the last minute.346 By choosing to wait until the end of a lengthy registration 
 
 341 See Peterson v. Cook, 121 N.W.2d 399, 400–02 (Neb. 1963) (holding that an election conducted five 
days after a major blizzard was valid, despite the fact that some voters “wholly or partly isolated by drifts 
could not get out to vote”); cf. State ex rel. Sch. Dist. v. Schmiesing, 66 N.W.2d 20, 27 (Minn. 1954) (holding 
that an election remained valid even though three precincts did not open due to a heavy snowstorm, because 
the proposition being voted on overwhelmingly passed and votes from those precincts would not have made a 
difference).  
 342 Peterson, 121 N.W.2d at 402 (quoting Schmiesing, 66 N.W.2d at 27). 
 343 See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189–91 (2008).  
 344 Cf. Morley, supra note 245, at 297 (“The severity of the remedy set forth in § 2 [of the Fourteenth 
Amendment] strongly implies that the right to vote protects individuals against acts that are sufficiently serious 
to warrant the extreme relief of reduction in representation: actual, literal disenfranchisement.”).  
 345 For example, for a voter seeking to register to vote specifically in a presidential or congressional 
election, one might reasonably measure the time since the voter registration cutoff for the previous presidential 
or congressional election, which would be approximately two or four years earlier. If one measures instead 
from the voter registration cutoff for the primary election or the most recent state or local general election, the 
registration period may be only months long.  
 346 Diaz v. Cobb, 541 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1334–35 (S.D. Fla. 2008). 
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period before attempting to register, a person necessarily runs the risk that 
circumstances ranging from personal tragedy to natural disaster might interfere 
with registration.  
States, conversely, have important interests in adhering to voter registration 
deadlines in the wake of election emergencies to allow them to focus their 
resources on recovering from the emergency, ensuring the accuracy of voter 
registrations they have received, relocating polling places as needed, ensuring 
adequate staffing for the voting period, and otherwise minimizing the 
likelihood of errors or delays in voting.347 Even if a person’s individualized 
circumstances may occasionally give rise to an as-applied due process claim 
warranting relief specifically for him or her,348 an election emergency should 
seldom warrant extending a voter registration deadline on a large-scale basis.   
A similar analysis applies to early voting periods. Voters do not have a 
constitutional right to engage in absentee or early voting.349 Indeed, 
approximately a dozen states do not have early voting and allow absentee 
voting only for certain groups of voters, such as the disabled (“excuse-based” 
absentee voting).350 Because early voting is constitutionally gratuitous, a state 
may satisfy the constitutional right to vote by offering an opportunity to vote 
on Election Day itself. If people in some regions of a state receive a few extra 
days of early voting because an election emergency requires that polling places 
elsewhere be shut down, such circumstances do not constitute intentional 
discrimination that would trigger Equal Protection concerns.351 A deadline for 
 
 347 Bethea v. Deal, No. CV-216-140, 2016 WL 6123241, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 19, 2016); see also 
Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S 679, 680 (1973) (per curiam); Diaz, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 1336–40.  
 348 See Morley, supra note 234, at 550–53 (arguing that courts should presumptively award Plaintiff-
Oriented Injunctions enforcing the rights only of the litigants before them).  
 349 Although few precedents squarely address early voting, the Supreme Court has held that the 
Constitution does not require absentee voting, which may be considered a type of early voting. McDonald v. 
Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (holding that the “claimed right to receive absentee 
ballots” is not a component of the constitutionally protected “right to vote”); see also Crawford v. Marion Cty. 
Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 209 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“That the State accommodates some voters by 
permitting (not requiring) the casting of absentee or provisional ballots, is an indulgence—not a constitutional 
imperative that falls short of what is required.”); O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 536 (1974) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (“The State, after all, as a matter of constitutional requirement, need not have provided for any 
absentee registration or absentee voting.”); Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130 (7th Cir. 2004) (declining 
to recognize “a blanket right of registered voters to vote by absentee ballot”). But see Obama for Am. v. 
Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 435–36 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that ending in-person early voting earlier for civilians 
than members of the military was unconstitutional).  
 350 See Absentee and Early Voting, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 17, 2017), http://www. 
ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx.  
 351 Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1944) (rejecting a candidate’s Equal Protection claim arising 
from his exclusion from the ballot because the state had not engaged in intentional discrimination); see also 
Southerland v. Fritz, 955 F. Supp. 760, 762 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding that an election modification in a 
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early voting remains “a neutral, nondiscriminatory regulation of voting 
procedure”352 that does not trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny, even 
when an election emergency cuts it short for some people. The need to extend 
early voting periods is even further reduced in the twenty-seven states that 
allow no-excuse absentee voting.353 In such jurisdictions, voters who do not 
wish to vote in person on Election Day may request absentee ballots and vote 
by mail. Consequently, Due Process and Equal Protection concerns virtually 
never require the extension of early voting periods due to election 
emergencies.   
In cases where an election emergency actually threatens to cause or causes 
a constitutional violation, a court should tailor its relief to allow the state to 
enforce its election laws to the greatest extent practicable.354 Modifying the 
rules governing elections raises separation of powers and sometimes 
federalism concerns.355 In most cases, such as Hurricane Sandy,356 election 
modifications—discrete changes to particular election laws to remedy 
substantial burdens on the right to vote357—should be sufficient. In extreme 
cases, such as September 11,358 an election postponement will be the only 
appropriate remedy. A court should not order a complete election cancellation, 
however. Such an extreme step should not be considered a possible remedy for 
constitutional violations, but rather is appropriate only when deemed necessary 
by government officials acting pursuant to an election emergency statute. 
Postponements and modifications are more finely tailored remedial tools for 
constitutional violations than complete cancellations.  
 
presidential election was inappropriate despite “poor weather” that reduced voter turnout to half the level from 
the previous presidential election); cf. Corning v. Bd. of Elections, 454 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165–66 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1982) (holding that a law establishing different polling hours for different counties within a state did not 
burden the fundamental right to vote, did not trigger strict scrutiny, and survived rational basis scrutiny).  
 352 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 203 (plurality).  
 353 Id.  
 354 See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (holding that a judicial remedy for a constitutional 
violation “must of course be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has 
established”); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979) (“[I]njunctive relief should be no more 
burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (“[T]he nature of the [constitutional] violation determines 
the scope of the remedy.”).  
 355 The Constitution places primary responsibility for regulating elections on the political branches, 
including Congress and state legislatures. Morley, supra note 21, at 90–92; cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 
452, 460 (1991) (recognizing that selection of government officials is “a decision of the most fundamental sort 
for a sovereign entity”).  
 356 See supra Section I.C.   
 357 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.  
 358 See supra Section I.A.  
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C. The Timing of Election Challenges 
The timing of requests for emergency relief concerning impending 
elections based on natural disasters, terrorist attacks, or other calamities is a 
critical consideration. A court may properly reject a request submitted too 
early before a potential disaster on the grounds that the plaintiffs have failed to 
show that a sufficiently imminent likelihood of future injury exists.359 It can be 
difficult to predict the path of a hurricane or tornado even a few days in 
advance.360 Hurricanes that appear potentially devastating may change 
direction or be downgraded to tropical storms before making landfall.  
In 2011, for example, the New York City subway system was closed, 
Broadway shuttered, and approximately 370,000 residents evacuated in 
preparation for Hurricane Irene.361 Irene was redesignated a tropical storm 
before hitting New York City, however, and “the worst nightmare scenarios 
did not materialize”; the Hudson River did not overflow and subway tunnels 
did not flood as predicted.362 Courts should avoid delaying or modifying the 
rules of an election unless such relief is highly likely to be necessary. They 
should generally decline to do so as a purely prophylactic measure, based on a 
possibility short of a substantial likelihood that a disaster will hit in a few days. 
Conversely, while courts in appropriate circumstances may order re-
votes,363 they should apply the doctrine of laches364 aggressively to impose a 
strong presumption against ex post constitutional challenges to elections based 
 
 359 See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983) (holding that a plaintiff seeking 
injunctive relief must prove the existence of a “real and immediate threat” to its rights).  
 360 See Brian Helmuth, Forecasting the Impacts of Climate Change on Coastal Ecosystems: How Do We 
Integrate Science and Policy?, 16 S.E. ENVTL. L.J. 207, 218 (2007).  
 361 Geraldine Baum et al., N.Y. City Closes as Irene Threatens: Thousands Leave, Streets Deserted, 
BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 28, 2011, at A6.  
 362 Goodbye, Irene: CNY Dodges Another Bullet, POST-STANDARD (Aug. 30, 2011, 10:00 AM), 
http://blog.syracuse.com/opinion/2011/08/goodbye_irene_cny_dodges_anoth.html; see also Erin Einhorn, 
Analysis: Too Much Just Right for Bloomy, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 29, 2011, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/mayor-bloomberg-sky-is-falling-act-hero-hurricane-irene-article-
1.944610 (“Plenty of New Yorkers grumbled that mandatory evacuations and constant warnings were an 
extreme overreaction, but history will remember Hurricane Irene as a victory for Mayor Bloomberg.”); 
Editorial, Apocalypse Not, N.Y. POST (Aug. 29, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2011/08/29/apocalypse-
not-4/ (“[B]y most accounts the New York City metro area dodged a high-caliber weather bullet from 
Hurricane Irene—which, in the end, turned out to be more bluster than blowout.”). 
 363 See Hasen, supra note 8, at 992; Mulroy, supra note 8; supra notes 17, 39 and accompanying text. 
 364 See Bowman v. Wathen, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 189, 194 (1843) (“The doctrine of an equitable bar by 
lapse of time, so distinctly announced by the chancellors of England and Ireland . . . should now be regarded as 
settled law by this court.”); see also McQuiddy v. Ware, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 14, 19 (1874) (“Equity always 
refuses to interfere where there has been gross laches in the prosecution of rights.”).  
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on disasters after voter turnout and, especially, the results of the election are 
known.365 As Professor Richard L. Hasen explains: 
Allowing post-election review when pre-election review would 
have been relatively easy to request essentially gives a campaign 
the “option” whether to sue: The campaign identifying a potential 
election problem can sit on its hands until it sees the election 
results, and if it does not like the election results it can use the 
problem as an excuse to get a more favorable outcome. It is far 
better to have a legal system that discourages such speculation 
and encourages preventing harm in elections that would prove 
difficult to undo after the fact.366 
One potential difficulty in applying laches in this context is that, 
particularly if courts assiduously refuse to entertain premature or unripe 
claims, as recommended above, the window for bringing a lawsuit may be only 
a day or two long, and a post-election challenge may be untimely by only a 
few days. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that laches is a flexible 
doctrine, and the concept of “undue delay” must be assessed based on the 
individualized circumstances of each case.367 “[T]he doctrine of estoppel by 
laches is not one which can be measured out in days and months, as though it 
were a statute of limitations. For what might be inexcusable delay in one case 
would not be inconsistent with diligence in another . . . .”368   
Laches bars a claim when a party has prejudiced its opponent by failing to 
diligently assert it.369 When an emergency appears likely to arise prior to an 
election, but a litigant waits until afterwards to press its claims, it has failed to 
act with the diligence the circumstances require. Moreover, once a jurisdiction 
goes through the substantial time and expense of holding an election and 
people have exercised their fundamental right to vote, the government, those 
voters, and the prevailing candidates all would be substantially prejudiced by a 
belated order nullifying the election. Thus, under the doctrine of laches, even 
circumstances that amount to a constitutional violation and would have 
warranted an ex ante election modification or postponement seldom should 
warrant the extreme ex post relief of reopening or nullifying a completed 
election.  
 
 365 See Hasen, supra note 8, at 998 (“Courts should see it as in the public interest in election law cases to 
aggressively apply laches so as to prevent litigants from securing options over election administration 
problems.”).  
 366 Id. at 994.  
 367 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 509 (1913).  
 368 Id.  
 369 Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961).  
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Thus, to be timely, a request for emergency relief concerning an upcoming 
election should be filed at the earliest reasonably possible point after it is 
substantially certain that an impending or ongoing disaster will impact the 
election. If such likelihood is reasonably ascertainable prior to an election, 
claims for relief once the election has commenced—and especially once it is 
over—should be denied due to laches. A plaintiff should be able to overcome 
laches in a post-election claim for relief only when: (1) one or more polling 
places closed permanently on Election Day and were not replaced, (2) the 
closures could not have been reasonably foreseen prior to the election, and (3) 
the number of uncast ballots from registered voters in the affected polling 
locations is sufficient to affect the outcome of the race(s) at issue.  
D. Geographic Scope of the Election and Emergency 
A court’s willingness to modify or postpone an election based on an 
election emergency should also depend on the geographic scope of both the 
election and the emergency. At one extreme, the easiest scenario is when an 
emergency encompasses the entire jurisdiction in which an election is to occur 
or occurred. In such cases, courts should be more willing to grant jurisdiction-
wide relief because all voters participating in the election are affected, albeit to 
varying degrees. At the other extreme, if an emergency does not affect either 
government services or the ordinary course of business anywhere within the 
jurisdiction in which an election is being held, a court generally should not 
order relief there. 
Two scenarios are much more difficult and admit no easy answers. It is 
precisely because such intractable circumstances are susceptible to multiple 
arguably reasonable solutions that states should settle on a particular approach 
ex ante and codify it in an election emergency statute.370 Judges should not be 
left to craft such remedies on an ad hoc basis in the midst of the emergency, 
purportedly as a matter of constitutional law, particularly when the likely 
beneficiaries of various potential remedies are known.  
The first most troubling scenario is when a terrorist attack occurs during, or 
immediately before, early voting or Election Day. A terrorist attack at a polling 
place will damage it or render it a crime scene, thereby making that polling 
place unavailable. Election officials could attempt to redirect voters to a nearby 
replacement polling site, but such an attack is likely to frighten voters assigned 
 
 370 See infra Part III.  
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to other polling places, as well. People reasonably may fear that the attack is 
part of a coordinated effort, and that follow-up attacks may occur.  
Voters assigned to any polling location that election officials shut down 
due to a terrorist attack, whether because the polling location is the site of the 
attack or as a precautionary measure, are entitled to an adequate alternate 
means of voting before the polls close. Part III of this Article proposes 
principles to guide development of an election emergency statute establishing 
the bounds of election officials’ authority to close polling places under such 
circumstances. In the event affected voters are not provided an adequate 
opportunity to vote before the election ends, the proper remedy depends on 
whether the number of disenfranchised voters exceeds the prevailing 
candidates’ margins of victory.371   
The U.S. Constitution cannot reasonably be interpreted, however, as 
automatically entitling voters assigned to functional and accessible polling 
places that remain open following a terrorist attack to a court order granting 
another day of voting. First, courts are the constitutionally least appropriate 
branch to assess whether the severity of a terrorist attack is sufficient to 
warrant stopping or delaying an election. The Constitution specifically makes 
state legislatures and Congress—not the courts—responsible for determining 
the “times” of both congressional and presidential elections.372 Likewise, 
federal and state executive officials are primarily responsible for public safety. 
The President plays a unique anti-terrorism function in his capacity as 
Commander-in-Chief,373 while the state governor is primarily responsible for 
public safety.374 Subjective risk assessments concerning the need to postpone 
elections due to the possibility of additional attacks are quintessentially 
 
 371 Huefner, supra note 8, at 299–302.  
 372 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may . . . make or 
alter such Regulations . . . .”); id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“The Congress may determine the Time of chusing [sic] 
the [presidential] Electors . . . .”). In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015), by a 5-4 vote, the progressive wing of the Supreme Court rejected the 
plain meaning of “legislature” in order to allow independent commissions to draw congressional district lines. 
See Morley, supra note 21, at 83–92 (critiquing Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission); cf. Michael 
T. Morley, The Intratextual Independent “Legislature” and the Elections Clause, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 849 
(2015) (arguing that “legislature” refers exclusively to “the entity within each state comprised of elected 
representatives that enacts statutes”). Even under Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission’s 
extraordinarily broad interpretation of “legislature,” the term would not embrace courts.  
 373 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“The Founders intended that the President have primary responsibility—along with the necessary power—to 
protect the national security . . . .”).  
 374 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN 8 (2004).  
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political questions;375 the judiciary should not be in a position of second-
guessing election officials’ decisions in this area.  
Second, the fact that people may be deterred from voting after a terrorist 
attack occurs at some other location—potentially even in another municipality, 
county, or state—constitutes neither a substantial burden on their right to vote 
that triggers strict scrutiny, nor an unreasonable burden under Anderson-
Burdick balancing.376 Any number of circumstances, including attacks either at 
home or abroad at any type of location, can reasonably cause people to be 
concerned about their safety at polling locations. If a polling place is open and 
operational, a person’s subjective fears about traveling there to cast a vote does 
not amount to state action violating anyone’s right to vote.  
Third, holding as a matter of constitutional law that ongoing elections 
should be cancelled if a polling place is attacked would give terrorists a de 
facto veto over the conduct of American elections. Moreover, cancelling an 
election would magnify the consequences of the attack. Beyond the loss of life 
and devastation the attack itself caused, cancelling elections would create 
additional disruption and uncertainty.  
If terrorists attack multiple polling places in succession, the prudential case 
for cancelling the election grows exponentially. As a practical matter, should 
the state or nation face such a coordinated series of strikes, it is virtually 
certain that executive or election officials would suspend the election before a 
court would be constitutionally obligated to do so. In the event that only one or 
two polling places are attacked, however, a court generally should not 
unilaterally assume power to declare that continuing the election would be 
unconstitutional.  
Under this standard, Judge Fisher’s decision to suspend the ongoing 
primaries in New York City following the September 11 attacks was 
defensible.377 The initial attack destroyed and rendered inaccessible numerous 
polling places. A succession of follow-up attacks—the second plane, Flight 93, 
the Pentagon—made the extent of the terrorists’ plans uncertain. Given both 
the breadth of the destruction and number of attacks, cancelling the primaries 
throughout the city was a constitutionally defensible measure.  
 
 375 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 51–52 (D.D.C. 
2010) (noting that decisions regarding terrorism should remain with the politically accountable branches, not 
the courts).  
 376 See supra note 245 (explaining the Anderson-Burdick balancing test).  
 377 See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.  
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Governor Pataki’s subsequent order cancelling primaries throughout the 
state was more debatable.378 He issued it pursuant to his statutory authority as 
Governor to suspend state laws during declared emergencies.379 It would have 
been less appropriate for a court to issue such a sweeping order on purportedly 
constitutional grounds. Though September 11 presents the extreme case in 
which broad protective measures would have been understandable, it is not 
clear that the attacks in Manhattan made it unconstitutional for elections to 
continue in Buffalo or upstate New York. Regardless, Governor Pataki’s 
actions following the September 11 attacks demonstrate that executive officials 
are virtually certain to cancel an election in the face of successive attacks, 
alleviating the need for courts to get involved.  
A second difficult scenario arises when a natural disaster affects, or will 
affect, some but not all of the polling locations involved in an election—should 
the election be delayed everywhere, or just in the areas that are likely to be 
affected or actually affected? When run-of-the-mill issues develop on Election 
Day at only a few polling places, courts generally should deny constitutional 
relief.380 Beyond that, the scope of relief depends on the type of election at 
issue. Any disaster that is sufficiently serious to interfere with a local election 
will likely affect most or all of the voters in the relevant jurisdiction. 
Consequently, when relief is appropriate, courts generally should extend it to 
all voters and polling places within the affected locality or localities, but allow 
parallel elections in other municipalities to continue.  
For congressional and statewide elections, including presidential elections, 
the issue is much more difficult. A disaster may affect, or be predicted to 
affect, only part of a state or large congressional district. Professor Steven J. 
Mulroy persuasively defends geographically limited relief in such cases, 
explaining it “target[s] relief narrowly to the places where the problem 
arose.”381 He points out that it may be “inequitable” to extend relief to 
“counties (or precincts) which did not suffer” problems.382 And granting 
geographically limited relief is preferable to simply “shrug[ging] off 
 
 378 See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.  
 379 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 380 See infra Section II.F.  
 381 Mulroy, supra note 8, at 242, 248 (“[A] partial revote might become desirable in a presidential 
election . . . [due to] fraud, terrorism, or natural disasters [that] . . . irreparably corrupt the election results, or 
prevent election results from even being recorded in the first place.”). Although Professor Mulroy wrote 
primarily about ex post re-votes, his reasoning applies equally to ex ante election modifications or 
postponements.  
 382 Id. at 242 (emphasis omitted). 
MORLEY GALLEYPROOFS2 3/30/2018 10:00 AM 
2018] ELECTION EMERGENCIES 601 
acknowledged violations of voting rights by saying no remedy is available.”383 
Although he recognizes that geographically limited relief may “skew” the 
results of the election by leading to a different result than otherwise would 
have occurred, “[t]he court must balance the unquantifiable ‘skewing’ 
potential . . . against the likelihood that the election results have already been 
skewed significantly” by the election emergency.384 Again, executive or 
election officials acting pursuant to well-crafted election emergency statutes 
have greater flexibility to approve election modifications, postponements, or 
cancellations than courts purporting to prevent or remedy constitutional 
violations.  
E. Plaintiffs’ Structural Advantages in Election Emergency Litigation 
Courts must be extremely cautious in granting petitions for emergency 
relief concerning impending or ongoing elections because plaintiffs in such 
cases enjoy several structural advantages. First, emergency petitions are often 
filed by prominent specialists, interest groups, or political parties that not only 
have tremendous experience in challenging election rules, but typically have 
extensively researched pleadings, motions, and briefs prepared in advance of 
major elections for key jurisdictions to address any contingencies that may 
occur. Litigators for defendant states and counties, in contrast, often lack such 
expertise in election law, are forced to defend against such suits and prepare 
responsive filings with virtually no notice, and usually lack any comparable 
motivation to vigorously defend the challenged provisions.  
Second, due to the harried nature of most election litigation, the judge’s 
initial ruling will likely become a fait accompli. Through careful forum 
shopping, plaintiffs can bring their emergency requests before a “progressive” 
judge who is most likely to grant relief and reject the government’s position as 
“poppycock.”385   
 
 383 Id. at 243–44.  
 384 Id. at 243. 
 385 Scott I, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1259 (N.D. Fla. 2016). The judge who presided over the suit to extend 
Florida’s voter registration deadline due to Hurricane Matthew, U.S. District Judge Mark Walker, offered 
inflammatory and partisan-sounding rhetoric in other litigation against Secretary of State Ken Detzner 
concerning the 2016 election. He accused Detzner of engaging in an “undeclared war” on Floridians’ voting 
rights. Matt Galka, Judge Rebukes Florida’s Top Election Official in Ballot Case, WCTV (Oct. 16, 2016, 7:14 
AM), http://www.wctv.tv/content/news/Dems-file-lawsuit-over-mail-in-ballot-signature-requirement-395883511.html. 
The judge added that he “knows disenfranchisement when [he] sees it and it is obscene” and “egregious.” 
Mark Joseph Stern, Federal Judge Excoriates Florida’s “Obscene” “Undeclared War” on Voting Rights, 
SLATE (Oct. 17, 2016, 12:02 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/10/17/ 
federal_judge_florida_s_obscene_war_on_voting_rights_is_unconstitutional.html. Such comments seem more 
appropriate for a political advertisement than a sitting federal judge adjudicating a voting rights case. Detzner 
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Third, election officials sometimes fail to vigorously defend challenged 
provisions, even when substantial arguments exist. In some cases, they are 
deterred from defending state election laws because the challengers stand 
ready to accuse them of voter suppression or disenfranchisement for seeking to 
enforce the provisions at issue.386 Knowing that some candidates rely upon 
voter suppression narratives for partisan ends, election officials sometimes take 
no position in litigation or fail to appeal adverse rulings, focusing primarily on 
minimizing adverse media coverage and avoiding last-minute attacks.387  
Moreover, since challenges to election-related laws are typically brought as 
§ 1983 civil rights actions,388 successful plaintiffs can recover substantial 
attorneys’ fees,389 even when the cases are brought pro bono.390 Defendants—
particularly municipalities and counties—may be reluctant to risk being held 
liable for hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of dollars in fees, even 
when they have meritorious defenses. The threat of attorneys’ fees can 
intimidate officials into agreeing to injunctions against election laws that are 
likely constitutionally valid. Additionally, in some cases, the secretary of state 
or county clerk may actually oppose the requirements they are charged with 
enforcing. Though nominally defendants, they may eagerly exploit lawsuits 
brought by ideologically aligned groups by agreeing to nullify or narrowly 
 
provoked Judge Walker’s ire by asking for additional briefing time while defending the validity of a state law 
requiring that a voter’s signature on an absentee ballot match her signature of record for her vote to be 
counted, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.68(1), (2)(c)(1) (West Supp. 2017). Walker was apparently angry that voters 
who failed to sign their absentee ballots were permitted to correct the oversight, while voters with mismatched 
signatures were not given an opportunity to attempt to cure the defect. Stern, supra. 
 386 See, e.g., Kira Lerner, Florida Governor Won’t Extend Voter Registration as State Flees for 
Hurricane Matthew, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 7, 2016, 1:08 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/hurricane-matthew-
voting-d412126ec0e6 (arguing that Hurricane Matthew “isn’t the first time [Florida Governor Rick] Scott 
attempted to suppress votes”); Zachary Roth & Alexander Jaffe, Florida Gov. Rick Scott Under Fire for Voter 
Registration Decision, NBC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2016, 11:36 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/ 
florida-gov-rick-scott-under-fire-voter-registration-decision-n661796 (“‘If [Scott] continues to stand on this 
ground, we do see it as voter suppression.’” (quoting Barbara Goodman, President of the Florida League of 
Women Voters)). 
 387 See, e.g., Fla. Democratic Party v. Detzner, No. 4:16-CV-607-MW/CAS, 2016 WL 6090943, at *6 
(N.D. Fla. Oct. 16, 2016) (noting that “[d]efendants raised no defense on the merits” of Florida’s law 
governing signatures for absentee ballots); Scott II, No. 4:16-CV-626-MW/CAS, 2016 WL 6080225, at *1 
(N.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2016).  
 388 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).  
 389 Id. § 1988; Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 552–57 (2010) (outlining principles for calculating 
attorneys’ fees); see also Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (plurality) (holding that courts may award 
attorneys’ fees in civil rights cases that exceed the amount of compensatory damages recovered). 
 390 Blum v. Stetson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984) (“‘[R]easonable fees’ under § 1988 are to be calculated 
according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community, regardless of whether plaintiff is 
represented by private or non-profit counsel.”).  
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construe laws or regulations they would be unable to amend or repeal through 
the normal legislative or regulatory processes.391  
Finally, because plaintiffs incur no risk by bringing such lawsuits, 
ideologically aligned groups have every incentive to litigate repeatedly until 
they prevail, even when their claims are weak. The worst consequence for 
them is only maintenance of the status quo. A governmental defendant must 
successfully defend against every challenge to continue enforcing an election 
statute, while only one plaintiff need prevail to obtain an injunction.392 In light 
of these considerations, courts should be particularly cautious in adjudicating 
emergency challenges to election-related rules to avoid giving an unfair 
advantage to one party or candidate.  
F. The Special Case of Polling Place Hour Disputes 
Most laws governing polling place hours do not contain provisions 
authorizing judges to hold polling places open longer in case of emergency. 
When an election statute establishes a closing time for polling places, neither 
election officials393 nor courts394 may unilaterally extend it for policy or 
 
 391 See Michael T. Morley, Consent of the Governed or Consent of the Government? The Problems with 
Consent Decrees in Government-Defendant Cases, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637 (2014) (discussing the risk of 
collusive consent decrees in which plaintiffs and ideologically aligned government officials ask a court to 
invalidate and enjoin a legal provision).  
 392 See Morley, supra note 234, at 494, 522 (describing the asymmetrical claim preclusion that arises 
when courts issue Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in non-class cases).  
 393 State ex rel. Mitchell v. Wolcott, 83 A.2d 762, 764 (Del. 1951) (holding it was “beyond question” 
that an agreement among election officials and political party leaders to hold a polling place open for an 
additional hour and forty-five minutes because numerous people had yet to vote was “a violation of the 
election laws”); Hogg v. Caudill, 71 S.W.2d 1020, 1021 (Ky. App. 1934) (holding that, because state law 
“fixes the hour for closing the polls at 4 p.m.,” election officials lacked authority to delay a polling place’s 
closing time by an additional three hours, and “ballots cast after 4 p.m. are illegal”); Easler v. Blackwell, 10 
S.E.2d 160, 163 (S.C. 1940) (holding that an election official lacked power to keep a polling place open for an 
extra two hours, “even though there is no suggestion of fraud”); Terry v. Sencindiver, 171 S.E.2d 480, 482, 
484 (W. Va. 1969) (holding that a statute specifying the closing time for polling places was mandatory, and 
election officials lacked power to hold a polling place open for an additional hour and ten minutes, even 
though fifty to seventy-five people were seeking to vote); see also Boone v. Humphrey, 349 S.W.2d 822, 823 
(Ky. 1961) (holding that election officials lack power to accept votes after a polling place closes); Varney v. 
Justice, 6 S.W. 457, 458–60 (Ky. 1888) (holding it was “illegal” for election officials to extend voting hours 
where voting problems at the precinct earlier in the day had prevented “a considerable number of the legal 
voters of the precinct” from voting, because the state constitution specified a mandatory closing time); 
Attorney ex rel. Pearson v. Folsom, 45 A. 410, 410 (N.H. 1899) (holding that election officials have “no right” 
to accept a vote after “the polls were legally closed”). But see Lane v. Fern, 20 Haw. 290, 300 (Haw. 1910) 
(noting that a statute requiring that polls be kept open until a certain time did not implicitly require they close 
at that time). 
 394 Southerland v. Fritz, 955 F. Supp. 760, 761–62 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (refusing to issue temporary 
restraining order or preliminary injunction extending polling place hours at certain precincts due to 
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general fairness-related reasons. As the Supreme Court of Delaware explained, 
“The desire to give every citizen the opportunity to vote is natural and 
understandable, but it may not be allowed to override the law,” even if election 
officials and political party representatives agree to it.395  
Enforcing statutes governing polling place closing times “ensure[s] that 
only those entitled to vote are allowed to cast a ballot.”396 In the absence of 
statutory authorization, the hours of particular polling places may not be 
extended on the grounds that they opened late,397 malfunction398 or inadequate 
supplies399 prevented people from voting, unexpectedly long lines 
developed,400 poor weather impeded voting,401 people wished to vote after 
closing time,402 or other impediments to voting arose. Votes cast after a polling 
place’s statutory closing time are generally deemed illegal,403 although 
 
malfunctioning voting machines and long lines); Republican Party of Ark. v. Kilgore, 98 S.W.3d 798, 800 
(Ark. 2002) (voiding a TRO issued by a trial judge extending voting hours because “[t]here is no provision in 
our Election Code authorizing an extension of voting times by the judiciary”); State ex rel. Bush-Cheney 2000 
v. Baker, 34 S.W.3d 410, 411–12 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (issuing writ of prohibition against trial judge who 
issued emergency order keeping polls in presidential election open until midnight due to long lines, voting 
machine malfunctions, and inadequate supplies at polling places); Newcomb v. Leary, 128 A.D. 329, 329–30 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1908) (per curiam) (“The polls are to close at five o’clock. . . . Therefore, at five o’clock the 
delivery of official ballots to electors must cease and no elector to whom an official ballot has not been 
delivered before five o’clock can be allowed to vote.”); see also Robert O’Brien et al., Election Day 
Challenges to Polling Hours and the Judiciary’s Cautious Response, 27 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 3–4 (2008) 
(“[C]ourts across the country have generally found that the judicial branch lacks the jurisdiction and authority 
to grant orders altering poll closing times in certain situations.”). But see infra note 414.  
 395 Mitchell, 83 A.2d at 765; see also Boone, 349 S.W.2d at 823 (holding that people should not be 
“allowed to vote at a time when the law says no more ballots should be cast”). But see McShane, 492 S.W.3d 
at 182–83 (extending voting hours at certain polling places in part because representatives from both political 
parties agreed).  
 396 Bush-Cheney 2000, 34 S.W.3d at 413.  
 397 Hogg, 71 S.W.2d at 1021 (holding that polling place officials lacked power to extend a polling 
place’s hours despite a fifty-minute delay in opening it due to the discovery of completed primary ballots in 
the general election ballot box).  
 398 Southerland, 955 F. Supp. at 761–62; Bush-Cheney 2000, 34 S.W.3d at 411.  
 399 Kilgore, 98 S.W.3d at 798–99; Bush-Cheney 2000, 34 S.W.3d at 411.  
 400 Varney v. Justice, 6 S.W. 457, 458–60 (Ky. 1888); Bush-Cheney 2000, 34 S.W.3d at 411.  
 401 Southerland, 955 F. Supp. at 762. 
 402 See Easler v. Blackwell, 10 S.E.2d 160, 163 (S.C. 1940); see also State ex rel. Mitchell v. Wolcott, 
83 A.2d 762, 764 (Del. 1951); Terry v. Sencindiver, 171 S.E.2d 480, 484 (W. Va. 1969). 
 403 Hogg v. Caudill, 71 S.W.2d 1020, 1021 (Ky. App. 1934) (holding that ballots cast after statutory 
closing time were “illegal”); Terry, 171 S.E.2d at 484 (holding that ballots cast after the statutory closing time 
were “illegal and void”); see also Bishop v. Smith, 350 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Ky. 1961) (holding that votes cast 
after the polling place’s closing time were “illegal”); Varney, 6 S.W. at 459 (holding that votes cast after the 
poll closing time specified in the state constitution were “illegal”); Attorney ex rel. Pearson v. Folsom, 45 A. 
410, 410 (N.H. 1899) (holding that election officials had no authority to accept a ballot after the polling 
location closed). But see Lane v. Hern, 20 Haw. 290, 300 (Haw. 1910) (holding that, even if a statute 
specifying the closing time for polling places were mandatory, votes cast after the closing time would be 
valid); In re Contest of the Special Election at Chagrin Falls, 110 N.E. 491, 492 (Ohio 1915) (holding that 
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violations of polling hour statutes do not necessarily require that an election’s 
results be set aside, particularly in the absence of fraud, corruption, or bias.404 
State election codes typically authorize a variety of remedial measures 
other than extensions of polling place hours to address the types of disruptions 
that frequently arise. Nearly every state has a law specifying that anyone 
waiting in line at a polling location at the time the polls close must be 
permitted to vote.405 Such provisions are valuable, particularly when they 
require election officials to affirmatively prevent impermissibly late votes.406 
 
“[t]he failure of the election officials” to comply with the statutory closing time “did not render the votes of 
qualified electors cast after the time fixed by law illegal”). 
 404 People ex rel. Seegren v. Sackett, 184 N.E. 646, 652–53 (Ill. 1933); Duncan v. Vernon Par. Sch. Bd., 
76 So. 2d 403, 404–05 (La. 1954); Special Election at Chagrin Falls, 110 N.E. at 492 (holding that the statute 
specifying a closing time for polling places was merely directory, so election officials’ failure to comply did 
not affect validity of votes cast late); Hamilton v. Marshall, 282 P. 1058, 1059–60 (Wyo. 1929).  
 405 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 15.15.320 (West 2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-565(D) (West 
2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-304(b) (West 2014); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14401 (West 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 1-7-101(1) (West Supp. 2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-174, 9-438 (West 2009); DEL. CODE tit. 
15, § 4947 (West 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 100.011(1) (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-413(g) (West 
Supp. 2017); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-131 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-1101(2) (West 2006); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-8-11(a) (West Supp. 2017); IOWA CODE ANN. § 49.74 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 118.035(1) (West Supp. 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:542 (West 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-a, 
§ 626(2)(A) (2017); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 10-301(b) (West 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 54, 
§ 70 (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.720 (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204C.05(2)(a) (West 
2016); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-541(1) (West 2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.407 (West 2014); NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 32-908(3) (West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.305(1) (West 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 19:15-9 (West 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-26 (West 2003); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 8-104(5) (McKinney 
2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163A-1130 (West 2017); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 16.1-01-03 (West 2008); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.32(A) (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 7-104(A) (West 1997); OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 254.470(10) (West Supp. 2017); 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3060(e) (West 
2016); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-18-11 (West Supp. 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-850 (West 1977); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 12-2-3 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-127 (West 2009); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 41.032 
(West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-302(2) (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2561(b) (West Supp. 
2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-603 (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.40.160(14) (West Supp. 
2018); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-1-32 (West 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 6.78(4) (West 2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 22-13-117 (West 2007); see also ALA. CODE §§ 11-46-28(b), 11-46-52 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 659.6 (2016). It appears that the laws of the District of Columbia, Illinois, Kansas, and Montana do not 
expressly address this issue. See, e.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/17-1 (West 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-
106 (West 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-1-106 (West Supp. 2016).  
 406 Several states require election officials to take affirmative steps to ensure people who arrive at a 
polling place after its statutorily designated closing time are not permitted to vote. In some states, an election 
official or police officer must stand at the end of the line at the designated closing time, and no one who joins 
the line afterwards is permitted to vote. CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 9-174; IOWA CODE ANN. § 49.74; KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 118.035(1); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 54, § 70; TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-127. A few states 
require election officials to secure the doors of polling locations at closing time so that voters who are already 
present are admitted, but others may not enter. IOWA CODE ANN. § 49.74; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.305(1). 
Still other states either require election officials to take the names of everyone waiting in line at closing time, 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 54, § 70; VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-603, provide them with hand stamps or written 
passes, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-1-32, or grant election officials discretion as to the most appropriate way to 
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Many states also require election officials to use emergency or paper ballots 
when mechanical or electronic voting machines malfunction.407 Courts have 
recognized that such remedial measures provide a mechanism for ensuring that 
people do not lose their opportunity to vote due to mechanical failures, 
inadequate resources, long lines, or other problems at polling locations.408 
These remedies both alleviate the need to extend the closing time for polling 
places and implicitly bar courts from doing so.409  
Allowing courts to extend polling place hours when such relief is 
unnecessary to remedy an actual constitutional violation raises troubling 
constitutional issues, at least in federal elections. The Elections Clause 
specifies that the “Legislature” of each state shall be responsible for regulating 
the “Times, Places, and Manner” of congressional elections, and only Congress 
may “make or alter” such rules.410 The Constitution likewise empowers the 
“Legislature” of each state to determine the manner in which it chooses 
presidential electors.411 These provisions allow only a state’s legislature—not 
its executive or judicial personnel—to determine the rules for federal 
elections.412 By extending polling place hours without statutory authorization, 
courts usurp the legislature’s constitutional prerogative.413  
 
prevent latecomers from voting, IND. CODE § 3-11-8-11(b)(2); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-26; N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 16.1-01-03; TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 41.032(b)–(c); WIS. STAT.  ANN. § 7.15(6) (West 2013). 
 407 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-450(g) (West 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-2421(3) (West 2006); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.782b (West Supp. 2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.265 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 19:48-7, 19:53B-3 (West 2014); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 7-120(1) (McKinney 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-
13-1870 (West 1977); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 125.006(c) (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-642(C) (West 
2016).  
 408 Southerland v. Fritz, 955 F. Supp. 760, 761–62 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (recognizing that such laws are a 
“remedy [that] prevents any voter from being denied the right to vote due to lines or delays at the precinct”); 
Bush-Cheney 2000 v. Baker, 34 S.W.3d 410, 412 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (recognizing that such laws ensure that 
“anyone in line” at the statutory closing time “will eventually be permitted to vote no matter how late the hour 
and their vote will count”); see also O’Brien, supra note 394, at 7 (“The most common remedy for Election 
Day delays at polling places is to allow voters to take a place in line before the polls close pursuant to the 
applicable statute.”).  
 409 Southerland, 955 F. Supp. at 762 (holding that a statute allowing voters waiting on line at closing 
time to vote is the “exclusive” remedy for voting delays); Republican Party of Ark. v. Kilgore, 98 S.W.3d 798, 
800 (Ark. 2002) (same).  
 410 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.  
 411 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.  
 412 Bush v. Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000) (holding that, when a legislature 
enacts a law regulating federal elections, it “is not acting solely under the authority given it by the people of 
the State, but by virtue of a direct grant of authority” under the U.S. Constitution).  
 413 See Valenti v. Mitchel, 790 F. Supp. 551, 555 (E.D. Pa.) (holding that, by “setting a schedule for the 
election of senators and representatives, the court [would be] acting in a role assigned and entrusted by the 
Constitution to the legislature”), aff’d on other grounds, 962 F.2d 288, 297 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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Courts may extend polling place hours when necessary to prevent or 
remedy constitutional violations, of course, but such relief is granted 
infrequently, generally in extreme cases, and tailored narrowly.414 In St. Louis 
County Board of Election Commissioners v. McShane, for example, the court 
of appeals emphasized that the request to extend polling hours had been filed 
by election officials, rather than a candidate or political party; was supported 
by both major parties; and was warranted because the complete lack of ballots 
at numerous polling locations for several hours would otherwise lead to “the 
total disenfranchisement of affected voters.”415 Moreover, the court 
specifically required that voters affirm “that they had tried to vote during 
regular hours” to be eligible to vote during the extended hours.416 Likewise, in 
Ohio Democratic Party v. Blackwell, a federal court extended polling hours 
only for voters standing in line at polling locations as of 7:30 p.m.417  
Polling place hour extensions seldom are constitutionally required. As 
discussed earlier, “garden-variety” election problems such as voting machine 
malfunctions, long lines, inclement weather, or equipment shortages generally 
do not rise to the level of constitutional violations empowering courts to grant 
relief.418 Courts should also be extremely cautious in considering requests to 
extend the polling hours for certain precincts because of the substantial risk of 
partisan manipulation.419 A political party or candidate can station poll 
 
 414 E.g., Ohio Democratic Party v. Blackwell, No. 2:04-CV-1055, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18126, at *2, 
*4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 2006) (explaining that the court had previously ordered that polls be kept open for 
voters standing in line as of 7:30 p.m. because voters had been waiting in long lines for up to five hours); 
Levya v. Bexar Cty. Republican Party, No. SA-02-CA-408-EP, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25916, at *1 (W.D. 
Tex. Dec. 5, 2002) (noting that a state trial court had extended polling hours because fifty-six polling sites had 
been relocated on Election Day itself, making it difficult for voters to “find[] their polling locations”); see, e.g., 
St. Louis Cty. Bd. of Election Comm’rs v. McShane, 492 S.W.3d 177, 183–85 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (issuing 
writ of mandamus, with the support of both political parties, compelling election board to hold polling places 
open for an additional two hours because several hundred voters had been turned away over several hours due 
to a lack of ballots); People ex rel. Woodside v. Bd. of Inspectors of Election of 56th Election Dist., 389 
N.Y.S.2d 242, 245–47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (holding that, where hundreds of valid voter registrations had been 
lost, requiring those people to obtain court orders confirming their eligibility to vote, election officials were 
required to accept their votes after closing time); see also Lake v. State Bd. of Elections, 798 F. Supp. 1199, 
1202–03, 1207–08 (M.D.N.C. 1992) (three-judge court) (holding that the state court’s decision to extend 
voting hours at all polling places in two counties in a statewide election due to voting machine malfunctions 
and long lines did not violate due process). Provisional ballots and electronic voting machines have reduced 
the frequency of many of these sorts of problems.  
 415 McShane, 492 S.W.3d at 183.  
 416 Id. at 184.  
 417 Blackwell, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18126, at *4.  
 418 See supra notes 326–33 and accompanying text.  
 419 Easler v. Blackwell, 10 S.E.2d 160, 163 (S.C. 1940) (“Such a practice, if permitted, might result in 
fraud or favoritism . . . .”); Terry v. Sencindiver, 171 S.E.2d 480, 484 (W. Va. 1969) (recognizing that 
allowing election officials to extend polling hours “could readily open an avenue to fraud and injustice”). 
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watchers in precincts that primarily support it to obtain affidavits about any 
irregularities that occur. Obtaining polling hour extensions only for such 
precincts gives that party and its candidates a tremendous advantage, enabling 
them to rack up additional votes while voting has ended in areas that 
predominantly support their opponents. The candidate or party that obtained 
the extension can focus its resources to “employ ‘knock and drag’ tactics to 
bring favorable votes to the polling places.”420 Courts should guard against 
strategies that render elections vulnerable to last-minute manipulation.  
Extending polling place hours is also permissible when authorized by 
appropriately tailored statutes. For example, North Carolina law provides, “If 
the polls are delayed in opening for more than 15 minutes, or are interrupted 
for more than 15 minutes after opening, the State Board may extend the 
closing time by an equal number of minutes.”421 The South Dakota election 
code likewise provides: 
[T]he county auditor may, upon request of the superintendent of an 
election precinct, if an emergency exists by reason of mechanical 
failure of a voting machine or an unanticipated shortage of ballots[,] 
or like unforeseen event warrants it, extend the polling hours for that 
precinct until the emergency situation has been resolved.422  
Such statutes are a more appropriate means of dealing with polling place 
problems than constitutional litigation since they are crafted by the legislature, 
which may authorize adjustments to the rules governing elections as a matter 
of policy even when they are not constitutionally required. These provisions 
are crafted ahead of time, before the beneficiaries of any particular decision are 
known, rather than in time-sensitive, high-pressure situations. They place 
primary responsibility for extending polling place hours on election officials, 
rather than leaving it to candidates or political parties to selectively seek 
extensions. And they provide, at least to some extent, objective criteria for 
determining both the propriety and geographic breadth of any extensions, 
 
 420 O’Brien, supra note 394, at 2 n.8; see also James J. Woodruff II, Where the Wild Things Are: The 
Polling Place, Voter Intimidation, and the First Amendment, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 253, 262–63 (2011) 
(explaining the “knock and drag” technique).  
 421 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163A-1130 (West 2017). 
 422 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-2-4 (2017); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1001.10(b)(1) (West 2017) 
(“The Board may, upon request of the precinct captain or upon its own initiative, if an emergency exists by 
reason of mechanical failure of a voting machine, an unanticipated shortage of ballots, excessive wait times, 
bomb threats, or similar unforeseen event warrants it, extend the polling hours for that precinct until the 
emergency situation has been resolved.”); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 8-103(b) (West 2013) (permitting a 
state or local election board to petition a court in “emergency circumstances” for “a remedy that is in the 
public interest and protects the integrity of the electoral process”).  
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rather than leaving it to the subjective, ad hoc discretion of judges. Such 
measures are one example of how laws specifically tailored to addressing 
election emergencies may alleviate the need for constitutional litigation 
concerning elections.  
III. ELECTION EMERGENCY STATUTES 
Election emergencies become constitutionalized in part because states lack 
emergency statutes adequately addressing them. Some states lack election 
emergency statutes altogether, relying instead on their general emergency laws. 
Such emergency laws are often inadequate for addressing election-related 
problems because they do not expressly empower governors to suspend the 
enforcement of statutes or statutory deadlines.423 In these states, even when a 
governor declares an emergency, he or she is required to continue enforcing 
the law as written.  
A substantial majority of states, in contrast, allow governors to suspend at 
least certain types of state laws during declared emergencies.424 By their very 
 
 423 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. ANN. STAT. § 28-9(b)(1) (West Supp. 2017); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127A-
13(a)(3) (West Supp. 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39A.100 (West 2015); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 414.060–
414.070 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:47(III) (2013); N.M. REV. STAT. § 12-10-4 (West 2014); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5502.22–5502.25 (West 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 9 (West 2007); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 19-13-104 (West Supp. 2017). Some states permit governors only to suspend regulations, not statutes. 
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 46-1008(5)(a) (West Supp. 2017); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 12.32 (West 2013); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 166A-19.30(b)(4) (West Supp. 2017); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 401.168(2) (West 
Supp. 2017); S.C. CODE ANN. § 25-1-440(a)(3) (Supp. 2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-48A-5(4) (2011); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 323.14(4) (West Supp. 2017). 
 424 Some states broadly permit the governor to suspend any state law.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-9-13 
(2016); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 14-107(d)(1)(i) (West Supp. 2017); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 29-a 
(McKinney Supp. 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.17 (West 2014); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-2a-209 
(West Supp. 2016) (allowing the governor to suspend any statutes except for laws establishing felonies); cf. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. app. A:9-47 (West 2006) (allowing the governor to suspend “any motor vehicle regulation or 
traffic act provision or any other regulatory provision of law” during emergencies).  A few enumerate various 
categories of laws the governor may suspend.  TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.016 (West 2018); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 43.06.220(2) (West 2009). 
Almost a majority of states allows the governor to suspend any “regulatory statute prescribing the 
procedures for the conduct of state business.” E.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 26.23.020(g)(1) (West 2007); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 12-75-114(e)(1) (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-33.5-704(7)(a) (West 2015); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 3116(a)(2) (West 2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 252.36(5)(a) (West 2017); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 38-3-51(d)(1) (West 2017); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 3305/7(a)(1) (West 2015); IND. CODE ANN. § 10-
14-3-12(d)(1) (West 2016); IOWA CODE ANN. § 29C.6(6) (West 2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-925(c)(1) (West 
2008); LA. REV. STAT. § 29:766(d)(1) (2007); ME. REV. STAT., tit. 37-B, § 742(C)(1) (West 2017); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 30.405(1)(a) (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 33-15-11(c)(1) (West 2017); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 10-3-104(2)(a) (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-829.40(6)(a) (West 2016); N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 37-17.1-05(6)(a) (West Supp. 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 6403(B)(1) (West 2015); 35 PA. 
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7301(f)(1) (West 2017); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 30-15-9(e)(1) (West 2016); 
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nature, however, such broad statutes do not offer any specific guidance or 
place restrictions upon governors’ discretion. They leave governors to 
determine the appropriate response in the midst of an actual emergency, while 
protecting the public from imminent threats and remediating myriad other 
consequences of a disaster.  
Several states have responded by crafting election emergency statutes of 
varying specificity and complexity. This Part begins by exploring the wide 
range of existing election emergency laws, then turns to past proposals for 
reform and offers a new statutory framework for addressing election 
emergencies.  
A. Current Election Emergency Laws 
Some states have enacted laws specifically addressing emergencies that 
threaten to disrupt impending or ongoing elections, but they vary widely in 
breadth and specificity. Florida,425 Oklahoma,426 and Virginia,427 for example, 
have detailed statutes addressing many aspects of the electoral process, while 
other jurisdictions have more limited provisions concerning discrete issues.428 
Rather than statutorily codifying any particular response, a few states instead 
direct election officials to develop emergency contingency plans for dealing 
with election-related disasters.429 Others, including Iowa430 and North 
Carolina,431 grant their chief election officers “emergency power” over 
 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-5-6(c)(7) (West Supp. 2017); cf. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8571 (2012) (empowering the 
governor to “suspend any regulatory statute, or statute prescribing the procedure for conduct of state 
business”).  
Others have enacted a slightly broader variation of that provision, allowing the governor to suspend 
any statute—not just “regulatory statute[s]”—prescribing procedures for conducting state business.  See, e.g., 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-303(A)(1) (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-2-107(e)(1) (West 2014); see also MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 44.100(1)(3)(g)–(h) (West 2013) (allowing the governor to suspend such laws, as well as any 
statutory requirements concerning licensure, certification, or permitting). 
 425 Elections Emergency Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.731–101.74 (West 2017).  
 426 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 22-101–22-110 (West 2011).  
 427 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-603.1, 24.2-713 (West 2014). 
 428 See infra notes 436–42 and accompanying text. Delaware has an antiquated statute to facilitate 
elections in the event of a foreign invasion. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 5301–5312 (West 2011). Texas, in 
contrast, allows the governor to authorize elections to be held before the scheduled date if an emergency exists, 
but does not expressly authorize elections to be delayed. TEX. ELEC. CODE § 41.0011 (West 2010). 
 429 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-174a(a) (West 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204B.181 (West 
2018); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.733(3) (West 2017) (requiring the Department of State to adopt an 
election emergency contingency plan); LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:401.3(B)(1) (2012) (requiring the secretary of 
state to develop an election emergency plan when the governor declares a state of emergency).  
 430 IOWA CODE ANN. § 47.1(2) (West 2017).  
 431 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163A-750(a) (West 2017). 
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elections when a “natural or other disaster,” “extremely inclement weather,” or 
armed conflict occurs.  
Florida allows the governor to “suspend or delay any election” upon 
declaring a state of emergency or “impending emergency.”432 Maryland goes 
further, empowering the governor to issue an emergency proclamation to 
postpone an election or specify “alternate voting locations” and “alternate 
voting systems.”433 In the absence of a declaration of emergency, a state or 
local board of elections may petition a court to “provide a remedy that is in the 
public interest and protects the integrity of the electoral process.”434 Utah 
likewise delegates broad discretion to the lieutenant governor to designate a 
special “method, time, or location for, or relating to[]” voting, absentee ballots, 
and the determination of election returns in response to election 
emergencies.435  
The most common election emergency laws authorize election officials to 
relocate polling places436 or use paper ballots when problems arise only at 
certain locations.437 State election codes also frequently waive restrictions on 
absentee ballots during emergencies,438 although some codes permit only more 
limited election modifications concerning absentee ballots. Missouri, for 
example, allows the secretary of state to authorize voters to return completed 
 
 432 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.733(1)–(2) (requiring postponed elections to be rescheduled within ten days).  
 433 MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 8-103(a) (West 2013).  
 434 Id. § 8-103(b)(1).  
 435 UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-308(1)(b), (2) (West 2016).  
 436 E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-5-108(1)(a) (West 2017); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.74 (West 2013); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-265(a) (West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-92.3 (West 2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 25-2701(d)(1) (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:401.2(A) (2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 631-
A(3) (2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 204B.14(2)(c), 204B.175(2) (West 2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-3-211 
(West 2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-7-910(B) (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-3-101(a)(4), 2-3-302(b) (West 
2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2502(c)(2) (West 2017). 
 437 See supra note 407.  
 438 E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-92.3(a) (providing that, “[i]f the extent of damage caused by any natural 
disaster” should “substantially impair[]” the ability of voters “to exercise their right to vote,” the chief election 
officer may require “voters of the affected precinct to vote by absentee ballot”); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-4-1(c) 
(West 2017) (“The commission, by unanimous vote of its entire membership, may authorize a person who is 
otherwise qualified to vote in person to vote by absentee ballot if the commission determines that an 
emergency prevents the person from voting in person at a polling place.”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 16.1-07-
05(2) (West 2017) (allowing a person who is prevented from voting “on the day of the election due to an 
emergency” to request an emergency absentee ballot through an agent, who “may represent only one 
individual”); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-713 (West 2017) (empowering the state commissioner of elections to 
“designate alternative methods and procedures” for handling absentee ballots and applications during 
emergencies); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-622 (West 2008) (“The secretary of state may designate 
temporary alternative methods for the distribution of ballots in cases of war, natural or man-made disasters, 
equipment failures or other emergency conditions or circumstances which make it impossible for voters in a 
voting area to obtain ballots as provided by law.”).  
MORLEY GALLEYPROOFS2 3/30/2018 10:00 AM 
612 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:545 
absentee ballots by fax during declared emergencies,439 while Maine permits 
election officials to apply the special rules for military and overseas voters to 
people living in declared emergency zones.440  
Some laws are tailored specifically to facilitate voting by people at risk of 
losing their opportunity to vote because they are responding to an emergency. 
Several states, for example, authorize emergency absentee ballots for 
emergency service personnel who are unexpectedly called to help manage a 
disaster.441 Others allow election officials to apply special rules to military and 
overseas voters when “a national or local emergency” makes it “impossible or 
unreasonable” to enforce the federal and state laws that usually govern them.442  
Some states go beyond election modifications, expressly allowing for 
election postponements.443 Colorado, for example, specifies that election 
officials may petition a state trial judge for permission to reschedule an 
election due to “an unforeseeable emergency,” or if proceeding as scheduled 
“would be impossible or impracticable.444 Georgia likewise allows the 
secretary of state to “postpone or extend” candidates’ qualifying periods, and 
to “postpone the date of any primary, special primary, election, or special 
election” for up to forty-five days in any area “affected” by “a state of 
emergency or disaster.”445  
New York contains a unique provision stating that, if less than 25% of the 
voters in a jurisdiction vote in an election “as the direct consequence of a fire, 
earthquake, tornado, explosion, power failure, act of sabotage, enemy attack or 
other disaster,” a county or state board of elections may authorize “an 
 
 439 MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.291(3) (West 2017).  
 440 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 663 (2008).  
 441 ALA. CODE § 17-11-3(e) (2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 657:21-a(I), (VI) (2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1-6B-9 (West 2016); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 11-308 (McKinney 2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 14-115.6(A) (West 
2015); see also CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3021.5(a)(2) (West 2018).  
 442 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.698 (West 2015); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-543(C) (2015); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 1-8.3-105(2) (West 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5524(a) (West 2017); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 34-201 (West 2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-701(2) (West 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163A-1370 (West 
2017); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 16.1-07-34 (West 2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3511.15 (West 2017); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 14-135 (West 2015). 
 443 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-92.3(a) (requiring postponed elections to be held in the “affected 
precincts” within twenty-one days); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-603.1 (West 2017) (requiring elections postponed 
by the governor to be held within fourteen days, or within thirty days if authorized by a panel of the state 
supreme court); see also infra notes 444–45 and accompanying text (discussing other statutes empowering 
state officials to postpone elections). 
 444 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-1-104(46), 32-1-103(21) (West 2017).  
 445 GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-50.1 (West 2011).  
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additional day of election” for that jurisdiction.446 The additional day of voting 
must be conducted within twenty days of the original election, and all voting 
must be in-person.447 The election’s results are based on the combined vote 
totals from both days of voting.448 New York law also allows election officials 
to extend any filing deadline under the election code when a disaster 
“substantially impair[s]” the “ability to make [the] filing.”449 The majority of 
states, however, has not yet enacted election emergency statutes.  
B. A Proposed Framework for Election Emergency Laws 
Commentators have offered a range of suggestions for ensuring that 
election emergency statutes preserve the right to vote, protect the integrity of 
the electoral process, and avoid unnecessarily constitutionalizing issues in the 
face of terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and extreme weather.450 Some have 
focused on requiring election officials to engage in contingency planning and 
coordinate with federal and state disaster relief personnel.451 Several pieces 
also suggest expanding opportunities to vote in general, such as absentee and 
early voting, to minimize the number of voters adversely affected by Election 
Day disasters.452 The Internet can also play an important role in alleviating the 
impact of disasters on voting,453 though important concerns about hacking, 
fraud, and protecting public confidence in the electoral system likely limit the 
feasibility of certain technological alternatives for the foreseeable future.  
Advocates have also suggested waiving many standard election procedures, 
such as voter registration deadlines454 and voter identification requirements,455 
during or following election emergencies. Such measures, however, play 
important roles in ensuring the eligibility of potential voters, preventing double 
 
 446 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 3-108(1) (McKinney Supp. 2016).  
 447 Id. § 3-108(2), (4).  
 448 See id. § 3-108(3)–(4).  
 449 Id. § 3-108(5).  
 450 See, e.g., Goldfeder, supra note 9, at 565 (proposing standards for determining whether to postpone a 
presidential election in a particular jurisdiction).  
 451 Gaughan, supra note 8, at 1042–43; Roy, supra note 11, at 229.  
 452 STANDING COMM. ON ELECTION LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, ELECTION DELAYS IN 2012, at 54 (2013); 
Clarke & Hewitt, supra note 11, at 518; Roy, supra note 11, at 226; see also Stein, supra note 13, at 66 
(demonstrating that in-person absentee voting facilitated voter participation following Hurricane Sandy); 
Rupp, supra note 11, at 295–96 (arguing that Louisiana should have permitted broader no-excuse absentee 
voting following Katrina). 
 453 STANDING COMM. ON ELECTION LAW, supra note 452, at 54; Clarke & Hewitt, supra note 11, at 522. 
 454 Roy, supra note 11, at 227.  
 455 Clarke & Hewitt, supra note 11, at 525–26; Roy, supra note 11, at 226–27; Rupp, supra note 11, at 
699.  
MORLEY GALLEYPROOFS2 3/30/2018 10:00 AM 
614 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:545 
voting, and reducing the likelihood of administrative errors—a likelihood 
which is magnified in the wake of natural disasters or terrorist attacks. States 
should generally avoid waiving voter registration deadlines or voter 
identification requirements in the chaos election emergencies create.  
A “Developments” piece in the Harvard Law Review recommends that 
election officials cancel registrations of voters displaced by election 
emergencies who choose to register in a different jurisdiction.456 Ensuring 
greater interoperability among states’ voter registration databases to identify 
and eliminate double registrations is a compelling idea, even outside the 
context of election emergencies. Although election officials are ostensibly 
required to ensure the accuracy of voter registration rolls,457 a major 
shortcoming of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) is that many of its 
provisions aimed at achieving that goal are unenforceable by private 
litigants,458 enabling partisan election officials to retain outdated and 
inaccurate registrations. HAVA should be amended to facilitate such private 
enforcement litigation. The National Voter Registration Act should also be 
changed to make it easier for election officials to update and ensure the 
accuracy of voter registration rolls,459 particularly since the federal government 
severely limits their ability to confirm voters’ eligibility when they register.460      
 
 456 Voting and Democracy, supra note 10, at 1187–88.  
 457 See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(1)(A)(iv), (a)(2)(A)(ii), (a)(4)(A), (a)(5)(B) (2012). 
 458 Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, 555 U.S. 5 (2008) (per curiam) (vacating restraining order 
compelling Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner to update the state’s voter registration database as 
required by HAVA). In contrast, private litigants may sue to compel compliance with the National Voter 
Registration Act’s requirements for updating voter registration lists. See 52 U.S.C. § 20510(b); see, e.g., Am. 
Civil Rights Union v. Martinez-Rivera, 166 F. Supp. 3d 779, 799–802 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (holding that a public 
interest group had standing to challenge the state’s alleged failure to maintain its voter registration list); 
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. King, 993 F. Supp. 2d 919, 925 (S.D. Ind. 2012) (same). Professor Daniel Tokaji has 
compellingly argued that courts should allow private litigants to sue to enforce election-related laws and 
restrictions without inquiring whether the statute creates a private right of action. Daniel Tokaji, Public Rights 
and Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement of Federal Election Laws, 44 IND. L. REV. 113, 115 (2010).  
 459 Cf. 52 U.S.C. §§ 20507(a)(3), (b)(2), (c)(2)(A), (d). The Supreme Court is presently hearing a case 
concerning the scope of states’ authority to remove individuals who have not cast a ballot in several years from 
the rolls. See Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 838 F.3d 699 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2188 
(2017). 
 460 See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2257 (2013) (requiring 
election officials to register any person who submits the “federal” voter registration form created by the U.S. 
Election Assistance Commission to vote in federal elections, even if they fail to provide proof of U.S. 
citizenship); Fish v. Kobach, 840 F.3d 710, 715, 719, 756 (10th Cir. 2016) (requiring election officials to 
accept voter registrations submitted through state motor vehicle agencies pursuant to the National Voter 
Registration Act, even if they are not accompanied by proof of citizenship).  
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One recurring suggestion in the literature is for states to establish out-of-
state satellite voting centers when natural disasters displace their citizens.461 
Unlike most traditional polling locations, which are limited to voters from one 
or more specified precincts, such satellite voting centers would be open to all 
displaced voters from a particular county or potentially even state. This 
solution would be most helpful when substantial numbers of voters from a 
jurisdiction have relocated to the same general area or a few such areas.  
States should craft election emergency laws to provide clear guidance and 
necessary authorizations for election officials, protect voters’ ability to 
participate in elections, and preserve the integrity of the electoral process when 
circumstances become particularly challenging. Election emergency statutes 
should distinguish among three main types of situations, each of which 
warrants a different type of relief. First, an emergency that is either of limited 
duration or affects only a limited geographic area is best addressed through an 
election modification, in which the election is allowed to proceed with only 
minor changes to the generally applicable laws. Examples of election 
modifications may include relocating polling places,462 extending the hours of 
polling places that were temporarily inoperable,463 using paper ballots instead 
of electronic voting machines,464 permitting voters to cast ballots through 
alternate means,465 or allowing re-votes if certain cast ballots are destroyed 
before being counted.466 One important issue such laws present is whether 
election officials should have discretion to implement such measures on their 
own, must wait for a declaration of emergency from local or county officials or 
the governor, or instead must seek a court order before implementing such 
changes. A statute requiring judicial permission before extending polling place 
hours, or making other substantial modifications to the rules governing an 
election, would be a particularly prudent safeguard.  
Second, for emergencies that make it impracticable, unreasonably 
dangerous, or impossible to carry out an election on its scheduled day, or that 
involve temporary displacement of a substantial number of voters, an election 
postponement is the appropriate form of relief. An election postponement 
attempts to hold everything about an election as constant as possible—
 
 461 Clarke & Hewitt, supra note 11, at 516; Roy, supra note 11, at 226; Voting and Democracy, supra 
note 10, at 1187; see also Stein, supra note 13, at 68. 
 462 See, e.g., supra note 436 and accompanying text.  
 463 See, e.g., supra notes 421–22 and accompanying text. 
 464 See, e.g., supra note 407. 
 465 See, e.g., supra notes 130, 137, 188, 433, 438–42 and accompanying text. 
 466 Cf. supra notes 175, 295 and accompanying text. 
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including the identities of the candidates and voters—while conducting it on a 
different day, typically within thirty days or fewer. To the extent possible, 
election postponements should be ordered when a catastrophe is extremely 
likely to occur, but before voting on Election Day commences. Postponements 
of deadlines should generally be avoided for aspects of elections that spanned 
several months, such as candidate qualification or voter registration. When 
elections are postponed, candidates should not be prohibited from making 
additional expenditures in support of their campaigns.   
Finally, an election cancellation is the proper remedy only in the 
extraordinarily rare case when a disaster causes a mass, long-term 
displacement of a substantial portion of a jurisdiction’s electorate, such as 
Hurricane Katrina caused. When the election is ultimately held, it is considered 
an entirely new and distinct event from the originally scheduled election. The 
candidates who will appear on the ballot, the voters who are permitted to cast 
ballots, and other critical components of the election are determined entirely 
anew.  
Several principles should guide states in applying this framework. States 
should opt for the least extreme form of relief possible, relying primarily on 
election modifications rather than postponements, and reserving election 
cancellations only for the most extreme circumstances. Election emergency 
statutes should provide detailed, objective criteria for determining when relief 
is appropriate, to minimize the opportunity for partisan considerations to 
improperly influence the process. They must be crafted to not only preserve the 
opportunity for voters to cast ballots, but also maintain the integrity of the 
electoral process after it has been dealt a potentially severe blow from a 
terrorist attack or natural disaster. Specifically, an election emergency statute 
must ensure only qualified individuals are permitted to vote, multiple voting 
does not occur, paper or electronic ballots are adequately protected, and 
opportunities for hacking, fraud, or partisan manipulation are minimized. 
Finally, as discussed earlier, election modifications, postponements, and 
cancellations should be ordered at “just the right time”: after the occurrence of 
a disruptive election emergency is sufficiently certain, but (if at all possible) 
before Election Day itself. A comprehensive election emergency statute that 
builds upon these principles can provide an essential bulwark for protecting 
both the right to vote and public faith in the electoral process. 
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CONCLUSION 
Though we are barely two decades into the twenty-first century, we have 
already seen the dramatic ways in which terrorist attacks, natural disasters, 
extreme weather, and other calamities can affect impending and ongoing 
elections. We can help preserve the fundamental right to vote by carefully 
considering the issues such election emergencies raise ahead of time and 
crafting emergency statutes to empower election officials to respond 
appropriately.  
